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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided a fascinating fair-use case, Cariou v Prince.' Patrick Cariou
claimed that photographs from his 2000 book Yes, Rasta were used by
Richard Prince2a to create thirty compositions called the Canal Zone
* © 2014 Richard H. Chused. Professor of Law, New York Law School. Thanks to the
faculties at Suffolk Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, and New York Law School
who graciously commented on and critiqued presentations of earlier versions of this Article at
faculty colloquia. Similar gratitude is due Parsons: The New School of Design for asking me to
participate in a colloquium on Authorship in the Digital Age. My colleagues Brian Choi and Ari
Waldman also read this Article and provided comments for my use. But the most important
comments about creativity, art, and law come regularly from my artist wife Elizabeth Langer-
not just verbally but in the sights and perspectives she constantly presents to me in her paintings,
collages, drawings, and prints.
I. 714E3d694(2dCir. 2013),cert. denie( 134S. Ct. 618(2013).
2. There is a companion website to this Article with relevant images and other materials.
Appropriation Art- Law and Culture, RICHARD H. CHIUSED, http://www.rhchused.com (last visited
Oct. 6, 2014). A a in the text means you can find related material online. A footnote will be
dropped with the appropriate link. Here the links are to http://www.rhchused.com/Pagel.html
and http://www.rhchused.com/Page2.html. The first page has pictures of Cariou and Prince and
the second pictures of Cariou's book Yes Rasta and the Gagosian book for Prince's exhibition. In
TUL. J TECH. & 1NTELL. PROP. [Vol. 17
Seres. The latter is a mixture of female nude figures and redone, often
collaged, images from Yes, Rasta-a collision of styles challenging the
cultural values displayed in Cariou's photographs.30 In March 2011,
Judge Deborah Batts of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that Prince and his gallery, the famous
Gagosian in New York City, were infringers.4 During the Prince
exhibition, Gagosian sold eight of the Canal Zone series for $10.48
million! The court ordered that the unsold works be impounded and
turned over to the plaintiff for disposition as he wished, and the owners of
the sold works were barred from publicly displaying them.' The Second
Circuit reversed, concluding that the material Prince took from Yes, Rasta
was fairly used in twenty-five works.6 The case was remanded for further
consideration of whether the five other compositions were fairly used.7
The central legal issue in the case was copyright law's fair use rule.'
Vastly oversimplifying an extraordinarily messy batch of precedents, fair
use allows a creator to employ materials protected by copyright if the
new use is transformative and does not negatively affect the market for
general, if you have the website open while reading, you can move from page to page using the
"Next" link on the bottom right of each page. There also are links on each page to the site's home
page, the table of contents, and the previous page.
3. See id at 6 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page6.html). Cariou spent quite some time
gaining the trust of the Rastafarian community. The juxtaposition of some of his images with
nudes of white women is both jarring and, perhaps in the eyes of some, demeaning.
4. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F Supp. 2d 337, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), revU inpart, vacated
in pari 714 F3d 694 (2d Cir. 2012). Gagosian took 40% as its fee. Id Seven other paintings
were traded for art estimated to be worth between $6,000,000 and $8,000,000. Id
5. Id. at 355-56.
6. Prince, 714 F.3d at 698-99.
7. Jd. at 712.
8. The vague, complex rule is stated in § 107 of the Copyright Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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the original work For example, Prince significantly altered some of
Cariou's pictures, usually mixing them together with dramatically
different human images in ways that radically changed the mood of the
original photographs.'° Such transformations, the court concluded,
created a strong basis for claiming fair use." Prince also (as is his wont)
dramatically increased the scale of the works-as can be seen in an
image of the Canal Zone Series exhibition at the Gagosian gallery.'2
The scale change was so great that it certainly enhanced the fair use
arguments."'
In this Article, I am much less interested in the copyright intricacies
of this particular fair use dispute than in what it, or more precisely the
work of the artist Richard Prince and some of his peers, tells us about the
state of art, culture, and copyright law in the opening decades of the
twenty-first century. Richard Prince was a major standard bearer for the
world of appropriation art in the 1980s and remains so to this day.4
Using his work as a starting point, I want to explore three overlapping
9. The literature on the subject is enormous. Anyone looking for a workable summary
might check out 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:2 (2010).
10. There are three comparisons of Cariou and Prince images online. Appropriation Art"
Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 3-5 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page3.html, http://www.
rhchused.com/Page4.html, and http://www.rhchused.com/Page5.html).
11. Prince, 714 F3d at 706-08.
12. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 6 (http://www.rhchused.com
Page6.html).
13. The unfortunate breadth of the district court's opinion also eased the way to reversal
of the lower court result. The lower court required that in order to be fair, a use must "comment
on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original work." Prince, 714
E3d at 704. Such a requirement seems particularly inappropriate, especially in a case like this
one, where the party claiming fair use is principally interested in wholly altering the way we
perceive preexisting materials. The grant of summary judgment to Cariou without careful
exploration of the role appropriation art plays in contemporary culture was surely unwise. But a
similar critique can be made of the Second Circuit's result. While the court was quite conscious
of the ways Prince played with Cariou's work, the distinctions they made between those works
where the fair use exception applied and those where it did not were just as arbitrary Id at 706-
11. It is worth looking at six images involved in the case. The images may be found at
Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 7-12 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page7.
html, http://www.rhchused.com/Page8.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Page9.html, http://www.
rhchused.com/Pagel0.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Pagell.html, http://www.rhchused.com/
Page l2.html). Items 1, 2, 3, and 5 were remanded for further consideration; Items 4 and 6 were
not. Are the differences significant enough to justify such a result? In addition, the Second
Circuit's willingness to allow Prince to transform the original mood of Cariou's photographs
ignored the ways in which those changes may have offended the people in the photographs and
their culture. While such moral right issues may raise important legal questions in other parts of
the world, photographs are not protected by moral right in the United States unless they are for
exhibition and limited to an issue of 200 copies. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A.
14. Prince maintains his own site. RICHARD PRINCE, http://www.richardprince.com (last
visited Feb. 5, 2014). As the items on his personal site indicate, Prince's work includes a number
of items that are wholly or mostly original.
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questions. Since the 1970s, some artists have become blatant and
unapologetic about their use of others' works. They both revel in their
takings and often decline to publicly acknowledge the sources of the
images they use. Over the course of the twentieth century, much avant-
garde art shifted from collage and use of everyday forms and objects to
unacknowledged reuse of prior artists' works. The first question asked
by this Article, therefore, is, from an art history and culture perspective,
why did this happen? Part II explores this question.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, why did appropriation artists
become so blatant and unapologetic about their tactics? Though the ease
of copying in the digital age is certainly part of the story, that is an
inadequate explanation for the culture of this part of the contemporary
art world. Culture, creativity, and law often interact in interesting ways. I
argue in Part III that, in addition to the historical currents of the art world,
the structure of copyright law itself encouraged the development of
appropriation art.'5 Just as appropriation art became a widespread
practice during the middle decades of the twentieth century, courts
opened the doors to widespread duplication and distribution of
copyrighted works by those using technology like cassette decks,
videotape recorders, and reprography machines. That synergy
dramatically altered the ways average users of copyrighted material
viewed legal constraints and significantly enhanced cultural acceptance
of appropriation.
Finally, are there any interesting legal and policy issues beyond the
obvious fair use problems that surface in what sometimes appear to be
simple plagiarism disputes under copyright law?'6 In Part T, I suggest
that as a result of the shifts in both art culture and intellectual property
law during the last century, the level of reuse and remixing of protected
material, by both artists and nonartists, became so pervasive that
traditional copyright enforcement strategies lost much of their utility.
Copyright law must be reconstructed to create a world in which
remunerating owners of protected materials widely used by others is
accomplished without the need to file litigation seeking traditional
monetary or injunctive relief from infringers. The goal is to define and
15. It also encouraged the rise of sampling and other forms of using previously recorded
music by the widespread practice of making "covers" of previously recorded compositions.
Though, in general, royalties were and are paid to the original artist for covers performed by
another artist, the notion that music created by one artist may be used by another without seeking
permission first has become a well-accepted part of the business.
16. The strength of this Article arises not simply because many appropriation artists
boldly copy the material of another person, but also because they give no recognition to their
sources.
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construct a system-not just for artists, but also for other standard
copyright areas-in which we accommodate ourselves to the frequency
and cultural power of appropriation without losing the incentives we have
traditionally used to encourage the making and distribution of original
creative works. This can be done by pooling funds from taxes on
electronic and digital equipment to compensate the owners of works that
have been remixed and widely distributed online." The final segments of
this Article discuss such a system.
II. APPROPRIATION ART CULTURE
Many of the pictures at issue in Cariou, though obviously
containing copied material, were artistically more nuanced than some of
Prince's earlier work. Beginning in the 1970s, he took photos of print
advertisements, edited out product logos and ad copy, and blew the
photos up to large sizes. While the works offered fairly overt
commentary on consumer culture, the images displayed little new
material except for some minor color changes and the substantial
increase in size. There were none of the collage effects seen in the Canal
Zone Series shown at the Gagosian. Nonetheless, Prince's enlarged
pictures of images from Marlboro ads made him famous. The Cowboy
Series, which he began to make in 1980, was a prominent part of a major
retrospective exhibition of his work at the Guggenheim Museum in New
York in 2007. The image used in the show's outdoor banner
advertisement was a revised version of a photograph called Stretchin'
17. This Article is not the first to urge use of such a levy system, though it is unique in the
breadth of its recommendations. I have previously written on the issue. See Richard H. Chused,
Rewrite Copyrght Protecting Creativity and Social Utility in the DigitalAge, 38 ISR. L. REV. 80
(2005). At about the same time, WILLIAM W FISHER II, PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAw,
AND THE FuTuRE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004) was published. Fisher proposed a device taxation
system to support a royalty-pooling system for digital sound recordings monitored with the use of
government provided product codes. Id. In this Article, I reject such a government-monitored
pooling system and recommend that all digital equipment be taxed and that copyright owners be
given the choice of continuing to operate in the existing copyright regime or opting for a royalty-
pooling system. I intentionally use art as the takeoff point to emphasize the breadth of
contemporary copyright issues that extend far beyond the often-voiced angst over sound-
recording duplication. Various device and media taxation systems have existed in other parts of
the world for quite some time. See generally P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, LUCIE GUIBAULT & SJOERD
VAN GEFFEN, THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT: FINAL REPORT (2003)
(reporting on dozens of device-taxing and royalty-pooling systems around the world). The United
States enacted the Audio Home Recording Act to handle anticipated copying by digital audio tape
recorders. That story is recounted well in Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principal or
Compromise? Understanding the Original Thini'ng Behind Statutory License and Levy Schemes
for Private Copying, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 422 (2004). Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012). The Audio Home Recording Act is now used to distribute a small
amount of royalties for digital copying devices that use media other than tape.
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Out, taken by Jim Krantz for Philip Morris Company, the maker of
Marlboro cigarettes. 80 Richard Prince slightly altered the colors of
Krantz's photo, cropped it, and dramatically increased its size.'a The
treatment of Stretchin' Out was typical of work in the entire Cowboy
Series.°a No credit was given in any of the works to those who were
responsible for creating the original pictures.
Prince was not the only person blatantly appropriating the creative
work of others in the 1970s and 1980s. Sometimes there were no artistic
pretensions-just greed and bad karma. Ford Motor Company may take
the prize for questionable advertising ethics by hiring one of Bette
Midler's backup singers to mimic her voice-a voice Midler consistently
refused to hire out to advertisers-in a 1985 TV ad for the Mercury
Sable.2 Others at least claimed the more respectable mantle of Prince-
like artistic inspiration rather than the sin of greed as their avatar. Sherrie
Levine, for example, hit it big in 1979 with photos of photos by Walker
Evans. In 1936, pictures taken by Evans, along with text written by
James Agee, were published in the iconic book Let Us Now Praise
Famous Men."a Images from that volume became synonymous with the
18. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 13-14 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page1 3.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Page4.html).
19. ld. at 15 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page1 5.html).
20. There are three pages of Cowboy Series images available online on the website: id. at
16-18 (http://www.rhchused.com/PageI6.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Pagel7.html, http://
www.rhchused.com/Page I 8.html). The photograph used in the advertisement on Page 17 of the
website was taken by Norm Clasen and is available on his website. NORM CLASEN
PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.normclasen.com/Marlboro-lmages/82/caption/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2014).
21. The song used in the ad was Do You Wanna Dance? A nice version of Bette Midler
singing it in Las Vegas can be found at Bette Midler-Do You Want To Dance, YOuTUBE (June
11, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nV5KGvQGaMY. The Mercury Sable television
ad sung by the voice imitator is available at 2008 Mercury Sable Commercial, YOuTUBE (Aug.
12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUiMioxOWP0. Midler sued Ford and prevailed.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). In an earlier case, Nancy Sinatra sued
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company for an ad campaign for its "wide boot" tires that used what
Sinatra claimed was a voice imitator to sing a version of her 1966 pop hit These BootsAre Made
for Wallin'with revised lyrics. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 E2d 711 (9th Cir.
1970). She lost, in part, I suspect because the imitation-if that's what it was-was not very
good. Id at 717-18. You can watch Sinatra sing the song at Nancy Sinatra-These Boots Are
Made for Walkin,' YouTUBE (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbyAZQ45
uww. The Goodyear ad can be found at Goodyear Wide Boots GT Vintage Commercial,
YOuTUBE (Aug. 18, 2000), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiKqHdh37dE. In both cases, the
companies had purchased the rights to use the underlying song without obtaining right-of-
publicity permission from the singer. Midler, 849 F2d at 461-62; Sinatra, 435 F2d at 712-13.
22. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 19 (http://www.rhchused.com/
Page I 9.html). Agee's essay in the book was a pared-down version of the original article written
for Fortune Magazine, which the magazine did not publish due to disagreements with the author.
The full version of the essay, edited by John Summers, was published in 2013 under the title
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misery of the Great Depression. The pictures from the Evans and Agee
book that Levine rephotographed, hung in a gallery, and sold were still in
copyright.230
Other examples abound. During the 1960s, Roy Lichtenstein began
using, without attribution, cartoon and comic book images in many of his
pop-art paintings. David Barsalou spent twenty-five years tracking
down, finding, and posting online the original images Lichtenstein
utilized in his work.24  Andy Warhol inserted images of cartoons,
objects, and famous people in his work beginning in the 1960s, though
he often copied colors much less slavishly than Lichtenstein. His iconic
copies of Campbell soup cans and of a Gus Korman photograph of
Marilyn Monroe are only two examples of the dozens of Warhol's
appropriations. 25  And, of course, there is the famous-or infamous-
Jeff Koons, who was the subject of a now classic copyright fair use case
about Art Rogers' photograph of six puppies in the laps of a man and a
young woman. 6 Koons reportedly tore the copyright notice off a
greeting card with the Rogers photograph on the front. He then
instructed Italian wood carvers to make sculptures that vastly enlarged
the scale, added touches like flowers in the hair of the main figures, and
painted the assemblage quite odd colors.27 Though Koons clearly was
poking fun at sappy greeting cards like the one containing Rogers'
photograph, he lost his fair use claim. The case was only one of several
appropriation disputes naming Koons as a defendant.8o
All of these artists-Koons, Warhol, Lichtenstein, Levine, Prince,
and their many other peers-claim to be cultural messengers who display
the banality of modem life, the futility of distinguishing the creative
work of one soul from that of another, the impoverished nature of
Cotton Tenants: Three Families. Christine Haughney, A Paean to Forbearance (the Rough Dra),
N.Y. TIMES, June 4,2013, at C1.
23. You can compare two of the images-an iconic one by Evans and the copy made by
Levine on the companion website. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 20
(http://www.rhchused.com/Page20.html).
24. Id. at 21 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page2I .html).
25. Id. at 22-23 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page22.htm, http://www.rhchused.com/Page
23.html).
26. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 304-05.
28. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 24 (http://www.rhchused.com/
Page24.html). The definitive article on the "puppies case" is Louise Harmon, Law, Art and the
Killing fa, 79 1OWA L. RE. 367 (1994). Harmon, with both wit and dyspepsia, harshly critiqued
the refusal of the court to find Koons a fair user. Other cases involving Koons include Blanch v
Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); United Feature Syndicate v Koons 817 E Supp. 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); and Campbell v Koons, No. 91Civ.6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1,
1993).
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traditional artistic categories, and the perverse, if not tragic, humor that is
embedded in the human condition. Such cultural commentary is obvious
in Jeff Koons' work. At times, his wit is both sharp and camp to the
point of hilarity. In a work called Niagara, he copied the lower part of a
woman's legs from a picture taken by Andrea Blanch and used in a Gucci
advertisement.29  Niagara referenced Andy Warhol's famous (and
previously referenced) appropriation of a headshot of Marilyn Monroe,
which was originally taken by Gus Korman to publicize a movie of the
same name.3" The movie Niagara, released by Twentieth Century Fox in
1953, was Marilyn Monroe's first major movie and catapulted her to
fame.' Koons' tongue-out-of-cheek use of Odie in his work Wild Boy
and Puppy had a stark comical edge. His fair use defense succeeded in
the Gucci case but failed in the Odie setting.3'a Finally, the 2011
exhibition of his work on the roof of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in
New York drove the point home big time. It starred one of his oversized
shiny balloon dog sculptures, 3 C, leaving an observer little choice but to
chuckle at Koons' deviltry and marvel at the willingness of the typically
staid Metropolitan to stage the exhibition 4.3  Koons and the other
appropriation artists of his generation deliver important cultural
commentary. Though easy for some to dislike or label as artistically
meaningless, these artists are the natural descendants of many others who
have used the work of others over the centuries.
That artists have used the work of others for a long time is clear.
Indeed, that reality causes a deep and probably insoluble problem for
present day copyright law. The basic notion that work must have some
level of originality to claim copyright protection is constantly in tension
with the reality that virtually all creative persons work on the shoulders
of those who preceded them. With perhaps the exceptions of some
American primitive artists and certain jazz and "blues" musicians, our
29. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247-48.
30. See Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 23 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page23.html).
31. Marilyn Monroe Biogmphy, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/marilyn-monroe-
9412123 (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
32. See Blanch, 467 F3d at 250; United, 817 F. Supp. at 379. Images of the objects at
issue in these disputes may be found at Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 25
(http://www.rhchused.com/Page25.html).
33. Appropriation An': Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 26 (http://www.rhchused.com/
Page26.html).
34. My wife and I went to see the exhibition. We chuckled. It certainly was an example
of the ridiculous decorating the sublime. For more information on the Metropolitan Museum of
Art's Koons exhibition, see Jeff Koons on the Roof, METRO. MUSEUM ART, http://www.met
museum.org/en/exhibitions/listings/2008/jeff-koons (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
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own artistic giants have always looked to their forebears for guidance."
Thomas Jefferson, perhaps our first important intellectual, artistic and
cultural genius, relied upon classical architectural rotunda motifs when
designing buildings for the University of Virginia and Monticello.3 a
Modem architects continue to use the rotunda form as a basic theme in
their work. One of the most interesting examples is the interior Queen
Elizabeth II Great Court Rotunda designed by Foster & Partners and
placed in the old reading room of the British Museum--originally built
in the 1840s according to the designs of brothers Robert and Sydney
Smirke"7a Art and architecture often mirror similar styles. The
aesthetics of Piet Mondrian's spartan, geometric paintings were tightly
related to some of the buildings designed by Frank Lloyd Wright,
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Philip Johnson. Look, for example, at
Mondrian's Composiion in Black and White from 1934;"D Wright's
Ward Willets House, designed in 1901;3'a and Philip Johnson's Glass
House, built in 1949.4°C The similarities are striking. And it is well
known that artists sometimes influenced each other in quite basic and
fundamental ways, even working together for periods of time. Pablo
Picasso and Georges Braque, for example, collaborated and worked
together in the development of Cubism between 1908 and 1913."'a
35. The arguments about primitive art and jazz could go on indefinitely. Simple art
forms have been known for millennia. And some aspects of jazz may well emanate from
modalities known in Africa and the Americas before the jazz idiom arose here in the nineteenth
century.
36. The Rotunda at the University of Virginia, for example, was based in large part on the
Pantheon in Rome. See Appropriation Art- Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 27 (http://www.
rhchused.com/Page27.html).
37. Id. at 28 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page28.html); see also Great Court at the British
Museun, FOSTER & PARTNERS, http://www.fosterandpartners.com/projects/great-court-at-the-
british-museum (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). Another example is the rotunda in the Williams
Library at Georgetown University Law Center. The architects, Hartman & Cox, quite overtly
relied upon Jefferson's work when they designed the building. See Edward Bennett Williams
Law Library (1989), HARTMAN-COX ARCHITECTS, http://www.hartmancox.com/projects/projects.
php?pid=41 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
38. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 29 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page29.html).
39. Jd at 30 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page30.html).
40. Id. at 31 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page3 I.html). Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's Lake
Shore Drive Apartments built between 1949 and 1951 and Crown Hall at the Illinois Institute of
Technology completed in 1956 are other important examples of aesthetic cousins to Piet
Mondrian, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Philip Johnson. See Lake Shore Drive Apts., ARCHITECTURE
WEEK GREAT BUILDINGS COLLECTION, http://www.greatbuildings.com/buildings/LakeShore_
DriveApts.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012); Crown Hall, ARCHITECTURE WEEK GREAT BUILDINGS
COLLECTION, http://www.greatbuildings.com/buildings/CrownHall.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2012).
41. See Appropriation Art Law and Culture, supra note 2, at
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None of this aesthetic influencing, of course, is either shocking or
subject to criticism. It is the stuff from which culture is built. The use of
prior styles and motifs is one thing. Slavish, large-scale, unacknow-
ledged copying is quite another. The stunning similarities in the Cubist
works of Picasso and Braque certainly do not suggest that they would
approve of Sherrie Levine's literal copying of Walker Evans'
photographs.
So how did the shift from stylistic similarity and artistic influence to
appropriation without acknowledgment of original artists occur in
western culture? The path began in earnest during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries with the arrival of collage and the shocking (at
least to many living at the time) use of everyday objects as artistic
subjects. Collage was in many ways the grandparent of the contempor-
ary appropriation art movement. Picasso was one of the earliest collage
makers, with a brilliant set of compositions made in the early twentieth
century."2a His inclusion of newspaper and other everyday materials was
revolutionary. Contemporary collage artists like my wife Elizabeth
Langer continue to make use of other's objects and ordinary materials in
their work."3a Many famous artists like Robert Rauschenberg and Larry
Rivers continued to develop the collage tradition during the last
century.40
But the most important of the early appropriators probably was
Marcel Duchamp. His well-known Bicycle Wheel and (in)famous
Fountain,'a created at about the same time as Picasso's early collage
work, were stunning confrontations of traditional notions of what can be
art. For Bicycle Wheel, Duchamp placed part of a bicycle frame and a
wheel upside down on a stool. "6 With Fountain, he placed a urinal on a
pedestal." His ribald redoing of the Mona Lisa was equally perverse. 8a3
32 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page32.html) (comparing two stylistically similar works by Picasso
and Brague).
42. See id. at 33 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page33.html) (showing Glass and Bottle of
Suze, created in 1912).
43. Id. at 34 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page34.html). In this collage, she cut up a
printed version of a publicity card for a Larry Rivers exhibition and mounted the pieces with
other materials to make the composition. Id.
44. Id. at 35-36 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page35.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Page
36.html). Larry Rivers worked with the poet Kenneth Koch, who wrote various lines on the
piece. Id. at 36.
45. Id. at 37 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page37.html). The name Fountain itself
resonates with the suggestion that all art begins with mundane, everyday objects--even (or
perhaps especially) those used for waste disposal in smelly public spaces.
46. Id.
47. Id
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At least all three of the items used-wheel, urinal, and Mona Lisa--were
in the public domain when he did his work. Nevertheless, Duchamp set
the baseline for many famous twentieth-century artists. Responding to
the Impressionists' focus on everyday life, dance halls, circuses,
prostitutes, workers, and still-life compositions, the early twentieth
century avant-garde took the natural step of making any object a subject
for inquiry. The use of everyday, appropriated items literally reached
enormous proportions (A la Richard Prince's blow ups of ad photos) in
the work of Claes Oldenburg,49a the scrap wood sculptures of Louise
Nevelson, and Peter Greenaway's use of digital images of DaVinci's The
Last Supper in a massive installation at the cavernous Park Avenue
Armory in New York City in 2010.5 °a
Perhaps the state of this part of the art world--especially the use of
found objects in art-is best summed up by Sherrie Levine's Fountain
(Afier Marcel Duchamp), a shiny bronze cast of Duchamp's Fountain
made over twenty years ago."a There being nothing new to do, Levine
felt she was left only with the choice of appropriating Duchamp's
commentary on the lack of anything new to do. Making fun of those
who make fun of artistic pretension itself became art-tongue-in-cheek
to be sure, but art nonetheless. The shift from Picasso's collages to the
brazen reuse of others' work without attribution was almost, but not
quite, complete. The only remaining form of appropriation-hinted at by
Levine's earlier photographic copies of Evans' work and Prince's reuse of
advertising images-was simply to copy protected items rather than
appropriate from the public domain, not worry about attributing sources,
and ignore copyright law. From an artist's perspective, it makes no
difference whether the reference reused in a "new" work is an everyday
public domain object like a bicycle wheel or an odd copyrighted
48. Id. at 38 (http://www.rhchused.comfPage38.html). In this piece, Duchamp drew a
mustache and a goatee on the face of the Mona Lisa. He also wrote "L.H.O.O.Q." across the
bottom of the print. If written out phonetically in French and translated, it would mean, "She has
a hot tail." See Jonathan Jones, L.H.O.O.Q, Marcel Duchamp (1919), GUARDIAN (May 25,
2001), http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2001/may/26/art.
49. Check three pictures of everyday objects supersized: a typewriter eraser, a clothespin,
and a pair of binoculars. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 39 (http://www.
rhchused.com/Page39.html).
50. Id. at 40-41 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page40.html, http://www.rhchused.com/Page
41 .com).
51. Id. at 42 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page42.html). The cast of Levine's work pictured
here sold for $440,000 at Christie's in 2008. Sherie Levine (B. 1947): Fountain (After
Duchamp), CHRISTIE'S, http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot-details.aspx?intObjectlD=5143
482 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
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photograph of a string of puppies sitting in human laps. Either
referenced work can inspire extraordinarily creative responses.
By the 1960s and 1970s, bold and unacknowledged appropriation
became not only artistically meaningful but also culturally plausible.
Giving appropriate credit to the original artists was not the point; social
commentary and criticism was. That fit the age. Attacking standard
norms, making fun of old-style artistic modes, claiming to own that
which was not yours,52 and outraging those with traditional artistic
sensibilities was standard fare during the raucous decades that were the
1960s and 1970s. Many cultural and moral boundary lines were blurry if
not invisible.
We reached the point in the history of western art where
appropriation and remixing of the old became a standard part of our
creative, artistic sensibilities. And, of course, no one should be surprised
that the digital realm is now in the center of America's imaginative stew.
There are many examples, some already classic, of the ways digitization
has been used to reorder, remix, and mash up traditional understandings
of classic artistic works. Jackson Pollock's drip paintings became fodder
for an award-winning website that allows anyone to use a mouse to
simulate making a Pollock-like digital work. 3 Or look at the way a
classic Dali wilted clock painting was digitally altered and posted
online. 4c Maybe the best example is a website where Van Gogh's
masterpiece Stany Night is digitally morphed in sync with motions
moving across a browser window while music plays in the background."
As an aside, the zaniness of this world-perhaps stirred by the egos
of those making the most money from it and the adversarial natures of
agents and lawyers-has shown up in odd ways. Those appropriating the
work of others are sometimes the most brazen in claiming their
intellectual property rights. The level of chutzpah 6 can be breathtaking,
52. Who can forget Abbie Hoffman's classic publication-STEALTHIS BOOK (1971)?
53. It is a lot of fun. Jackson Pollock by Miltos Manetas, JACKSONPOLLOCK.ORG, http://
www.jacksonpollock.org/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
54. Salvador Dali: The Persistent Memory Recreation, DIGITAL MEDIA 2011 (Feb. 16,
2011, 3:32 PM), http://jscdigi2011 .blogspot.com/2011/02/salvador-dali-persistant-memory.html.
The two Dali images also may be seen at Appropriation Art- Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 43
(http://www.rhchused.com/Page43.html).
55. For one page of remixes, see Joe Berkowitz, Get Mesmerized by an Interactive Remix
of Van Gogh' Starry Night, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 10, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://www.fast
cocreate.com/1679838/get-mesmerized-by-an-interactive-remix-of-van-goghs-starry-night. The
Van Gogh remix can also be seen at Stany Night ofVincent Van Gogh-nteractiveAnimation by
Petros Vrellis, YoUTUBE (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtNXuMo-DrY.
56. The best "analysis" of chutzpah is provided in a wonderful review of the use of
Yiddish in court opinions by Alex Kozinski and Eugene Volokh. See Lawsuit, Shmawsui4 103
YALE L.J. 463 (1993).
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as when a representative of Lichtenstein's estate wrote the rock group
Elsinore demanding that they not use on a record cover an image much
like one Lichtenstein previously took without attribution,57a or when an
agent for Jeff Koons demanded that the household goods design
company Park Life halt the sale of balloon dog bookends."8a Both
demands were later withdrawn after snarky public commentary. 9 Joining
in the fun after its run-in with Koons, Park Life marketed a T-shirt with a
picture of a blindfolded balloon dogYa
III. COPYRIGHT LAW CULTURE
The transition from collage to emulation to analog appropriation to
digital remixing is understandable as a matter of art history. But how can
it survive in a world with copyright laws? My perverse answer is that
copyright law actually encouraged the trend. That is the next part of the
story-a tale of some not very prescient judging and legislating in a
world of rapid technological change. Let us begin this part of the
account with mimeograph or "ditto" machines-devices invented in the
latter decades of the nineteenth century that used stencils stretched over
ink-filled drums turned by hand cranks at first, and electric motors later,
57. Appropriation Art Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 44 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page44.html). The story, as told on the Elsinore website, goes like this:
The painting we are using for our album cover was done by Brittany Pyle in a college
painting course. She told us initially that it was a piece influenced by Pop art, but
didn't mention anything about her source image. After we received the email from
Shelley Lee [from the Lichtenstein estate] I talked to Brittany again and she told me
that she hadn't appropriated form Lichtenstein. Her professor had instructed the class
to do an appropriation piece, and Brittany chose the same original graphic novel piece
that Roy Lichtenstein used when he created his piece Kiss V
A Copyight Violation?? ELSINORE (May 6, 2010), http://www.elsinoremusic.net/2010/05/.
Pyle's work also is posted on this page. Id. The demand not to use Pyle's work on the cover later
was dropped. Id.
58. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 45 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page45.html). For the New York Times story on the Koons bookend dispute, see Kate
Taylor, In Twist, Koons Claims Rights to 'Balloon Dogs,' N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/arts/design/20suit.html. This dispute was later dropped by
Koons. See Koons Backs Down, LEG OF LAMB (Feb. 8, 2011), http://lamblegs.wordpress.com/
2011/02/08/koons-backs-down/.
59. Mike Masnick, Jeff Koons Drops Silly Lawsuit over Balloon Dog Bookends... But
Not Before Helping To Sell a Bunch, TECHDIRT (Feb. 6, 2001), https://www.techdirt.coml/
articles/20110203/22582312959/Jeff-Koons-drops-silly-lawsuit-over-balloon-dog-bookends-not-
before-helping-to-sell-bunch.shtml.
60. Appropriation Art Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 46 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page46.html).
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to print words or images on sheets of paper fed into the equipment.6 'a
Some contemporary readers must be familiar with this now "ancient"
tool that moved complex printing from factories to schoolrooms. Cheap
offset printing techniques and Xerox copy machines were introduced in
the 1960s. The first desktop copying machine from Xerox hit the market
in 1963620 and revolutionized the copying business during the rest of the
twentieth century. The same sort of expansion in the ability to make
copies of audio recordings occurred with the arrival of reel-to-reel tape
decks for household use after World War II, cassette tape recorders in the
mid-1960s, and high fidelity double cassette tape decks a bit later. The
first important videotape recorder (VTR) for home use was the
eventually ill-fated Sony Betamax, introduced in 1975.3
Note well that the most important of these dramatic technological
inventions-the copy machine, cassette tape recorder, and VTR-
occurred just as appropriation art gathered steam. Not surprisingly, this
new technology produced significant litigation. Entertainment business
operatives saw the handwriting on the wall and did not always care for
the way it read. The most important and famous case involved the
Betamax. '  When the videotape recorder evolved into a consumer
item-cheap enough that it became a standard feature of middle class
homes-moviemakers and TV networks had an anxiety attack. The
dyspepsia was generated in part by Sony ad campaigns emphasizing the
ability of Betamax owners to set a timer to record a program while the
user was away, watching a different show, or doing something more
important.65 "Watch Whatever Whenever" was one of the sales
pitches.66 Concerned that VTRs would allow consumers to make and
keep copies of televised shows and movies, motion picture companies
sued manufacturers of the devices and a consumer who admitted copying
television shows.67 They argued that consumers infringed copyrights
when using VTRs and that device manufacturers were responsible for the
61. Id at 47 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page47.html). I could have started with other late
nineteenth-century duplication devices as well. The phonograph player is an obvious example.
Voice appropriation was its forte.
62. Id. at 48 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page48.html).
63 Jonah Volk, The Short Life, Slow Death, and Broad Impact of Betamax, NYU (Nov.
20, 2008), http://www.nyu.edu/tisch/preservation/program/studentwork/2008fall/08f 2920
Volk_ala.doc.
64. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
65. Appropriation Art: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 49 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page49.html).
66. See Watch Whatever Whenever with the Sony Betamax, RETROIST (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.retroist.com/2010/04/22/watch-whatever-whenever-with-the-sony-betamax.
67. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
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actions of their customers as vicarious or contributory copyright
infringers.68
Unfortunately-at least in hindsight-the structure of the litigation
was quite strange. The proofs at trial demonstrated that the primary use
for videotape machines was to "time shift."'9 That is, consumers used the
timer on the machine to make a copy of a show while they were not
watching so they could view it later. That sort of copying, the consumer
defendant claimed, was protected by the copyright fair use rule. The
manufacturers claimed the benefit of their consumers' fair use and
argued that standard vicarious and contributory liability rules did not
ensnare them.7"
Responding to these issues, the United States Supreme Court
constructed its opinion to answer two narrow questions. First, was "time
shifting" protected by fair use? And second, if it was, were
manufacturers of VTRs responsible for unlawful utilization of the
machines if the recorders were capable of "substantial non-infringing
uses?"71 Having narrowly structured the issues in the case, the Court
concluded that time shifting was fair use, that videotape machines
therefore had substantial noninfringing uses, and that, as a result, the
manufacture, sale, and use of the machines was permissible.72
Given the historical moment when the case was decided, the
structure imposed on the analysis by the Supreme Court made sense.
Though traditional secondary liability theories arguably applied, there
68. Id at419.
69. Id. at 423-24.
70. Id Under American copyright law, vicarious liability is imposed on parties who both
control the venue or system used to copy, perform, or otherwise infringe a work and receive
financial benefit from the activity. A classic case is Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v H.L. Green Co.,
316 E2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), which involved a chain of department stores selling counterfeit
recordings. Contributory infringement arises when a party knowingly contributes to or induces
unlawful activity. A leading case in this area is Fonovisa, Inc. v CherryAuction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1996), in which the operator of a flea market was found responsible for the actions of
parties renting space in the market and selling counterfeit recordings. On its face, contributory
infringement theory seemed to apply to Sony. But as noted in the text, the Supreme Court evaded
the issue by first asking whether the device itself had enough noninfringing uses to justify its
presence in the market. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
71. The Court viewed this formulation of the question as the best balance between
protecting the interests of copyright owners and creating appropriate incentives for industrial
inventors to bring new products to market. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
72. Id at 455-56. The literature on the case is enormous. Quality writing about it began
while the case was pending. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structual and
Economic Analysis of the Betarnax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
Much of the literature about the case is referred to in Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the
Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRS" Introducing TIVO to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 417 (2002).
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were good reasons for evading their use. Very few individuals or
companies involved in the movie or VTR business were interested in
policing the private use of videotape machines in peoples' homes. And if
time shifting was the primary use of the machines, the prospect of harm
to owners of copyrights in TV shows was minimal. Indeed, the Court
was justified in thinking that time shifting would produce more rather
than fewer viewers of some shows." Those not around when the shows
were broadcast could watch them and the accompanying advertisements
later. Therefore it was not surprising that the Court looked for a way to
minimize the impact of copyright law and maintain incentives for the
invention and distribution of new technology. And because technology
was so central to the litigation, using patent law-the staple article of
commerce doctrine-to structure its analysis of secondary liability also
was a natural move.74
The Court, of course, was neither able to predict all the future
consequences of its decision nor to control the way their opinion would
be read by the culture at large. After a time, it became clear that VTRs
enhanced both the broadcast TV market for movies and the
nonbroadcast, TV-based film market. As time shifting proliferated, the
number of people viewing television shows broadcast over the air rose
and videotape rental businesses like Blockbuster blossomed. Consumers
also purchased large quantities of recorded movies from the studios.
While some VTR owners duplicated television shows or rented tapes and
created movie libraries, the quality of those tapes never matched the
originals. The technology was not good enough to accomplish that.
Overall, the existence of the tape rental business created another way for
movie and television companies to make money. Tape rental became a
third run movie "theater" allowing films to be seen by those who never
managed to get to a first or second run or who simply liked the film
enough to watch it multiple times. Rentals also provided an outlet for
movies never shown in theaters. In short, the results were largely positive
for the industry-a boost for the wisdom of protecting the right to time
shift and copy movies at home.
But these positive consequences of the Sony case for the movie
industry in both its broadcast and nonbroadcast modes were not
73. See Bower, supra note 72, at 480-81.
74. For a review of that move and a critique of its use, see Peter S. Menell & David
Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941 (2007). For a bit more on the history of the
doctrine's use, see Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infi'ngement: Bittorrent
as a Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (2006).
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permanent. The result had other, more subtle, long-lasting, and
potentially subversive cultural effects. It created the widely accepted
notion that each of us had the "right" to use video recording machines as
we wished in the confines of our homes.75 As devices permitting much
more extensive duplication of copyrighted works appeared in the
marketplace over the following decades, that perception became the
cornerstone for arguments that consumers were free to use any
personally owned device as they pleased-that they had the fight to do
what they wished to entertain themselves in the privacy of their homes
or, later, in the privacy of their mobile, ear-budded reveries. As digital
devices capable of high-quality recording or storing of music, words, and
images became available, the cultural sensibility that taking copyrighted
works was not just okay but a "right" blossomed into Napster, Kazaa,
Grokster, and other Internet file transfer systems. This resulted in a
deluge of ear-budded music lovers dancing and singing their way down
the streets of America and a bevy of artists freely taking the digital
materials of others. All of this was bolstered by the simple observation
that "taking" a digital work sometimes created new markets and rarely
deprived others of access. In that sense it was not the same as traditional
theft-in either legal or moral terms.
The same basic legal trajectory can be recounted for areas of
copyright law other than movies and fine art. Use of copy machines, not
only in homes, but also in offices, became routine. And early on, courts
approved large-scale copying, especially in educational and research
institutions.76 Google Books arguably is one contemporary consequence.
The trend in music was even more pronounced. From early in the
twentieth century, any performer had a right, on the payment of a
statutory royalty, to make a "cover" of a musical composition after it first
was recorded with the permission of the composer. Though royalties
were paid-a distinctly different paradigm from either pure appropriation
art or fairly using the work of another-the making of "cover" recordings
became routine. It created a sensibility that recording the music of others
without permission was a standard part of cultural life. Therefore, it was
not totally surprising when in more recent times-not long after the rise
75. Use of the word "right" is entirely intentional. I do make the claim that many thought
the result of the Sony litigation gave them freedom to copy as they wished in their homes.
76. The most important early case was Williams & Wilkins Co. v United States, 487 E2d
1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), affU 420 U.S. 376 (1975). One of the most important recent cases adds
additional ammunition to my point that fair use encourages a significant level of appropriation.
In Authors Guildi Inc. v HathiTrus4 755 E3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), the court found that a consortium
of major university libraries acted fairly when they digitized books and made segments available
to those using search engines. Id at 97, 101.
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of appropriation art, videotape recorders, copy machines, and double
cassette tape decks--digital sampling became the rage in rap and other
musical genres and downloading became routine in dorms and homes
across the nation. For after the rise of "covers" came cassette libraries,
sampling, mash-ups-the sophisticated digital melding of sometimes
lengthy excerpts from various pieces of music to create new
compositions-and vidding-a similar mode using digital video. "Girl
Talk"--the stage name of Gregg Gillis-is only one important example
among a bevy of popular mashup artists. He gives away his
compositions online for free and makes money by entertaining large
crowds of dancing, arm-waving fans in arenas and halls.77 The genre is
now common in the electronic dance music realm, with well-known
composers like Anton Zavlaski, a.k.a. Zedd, reworking older composi-
tions. For example, Zedd recently used the theme music from the video
game Zelda in one of his pieces."
In all of these areas, large amounts of copying have been judicially
approved as fair use.79 Note well that I am not quarrelling with these
results. Most of the legal decisions arguably were correct, given the
inconsistent run of fair use cases rendered over the years. Many of the
creative endeavors in the digital world significantly transform the works,
forming the foundations for the new productions." Indeed, that is my
point! When combined with the widespread cultural sensibility that we
all have the ight to freely use significant amounts of copyrighted work
and the growth of systems to digitally store and cleverly manipulate
copyrighted materials, there was no easy way to cabin the extent to which
creative people felt free to use copyrighted materials in their work.8o
77. For more on Girl Talk, see Girl Talk, ILLEGAL ART, http://illegal-art.net/girltalk/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014). Girl Talk's most recent work, Al/Day, available for download on this site, is
widely recognized as a brilliantly creative mashup.
78. See Ben Sisario, Prodigies Leaping Beyond Electronic Dance Music, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/arts/music/prodigies-leap-beyond-
electronic-dance-music.html. You can listen to Zedd's take on the Zelda theme song at Zedd-
The Legend ofZelda (Original Mix), YouTUBE (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=zLzaZHXmjw.
79. A prime example in the music area is Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994), involving 2 Live Crew's adaptation of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" with
new lyrics. The Supreme Court ruled that the song was a parody protected by fair use. Id
80. For example, one website solicits users to submit digital remakes of fifteen-second
segments of Star Wars and combines these segments into a new film. The clips used are
dependent on user preferences, so the online movie changes constantly. A New Hope, STAR
WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/newhope (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
81. One signal that these issues have seeped into the psyche of the general public is the
large number of cartoons about copyright routinely appearing in various hard copy and online
publications. See, e.g., Appropriation AA: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 50 (http:/www.
rhchused.com/Page50.html) (showing two cartoons concerning copyright laws).
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Today, millions of people have the equivalent of major publishing
houses on their desktops at home and at work. Once large numbers of
people concluded that they had the right not only to buy such equipment,
but also to use it, we reached a paradigm shift. Even if a great deal of
our private activity-whether at home or at work-is illegal, the scale of
activity-both lawful and not-has become so enormous that it is
unstoppable. There is no turning back. If one speaks with art and design
students these days, one will find that many, if not most, of them
routinely use the works of others in their own creative endeavors without
a second thought." My, and perhaps the reader's, "archaic" sense of
moral limitation and ethical concern, as well as anxiety about the future
economic viability of certain forms of artistic endeavor, are not deeply
etched in their frames of reference.83 Rather, they are deeply interested in
working with the digital world to enhance community participation in
creativity, develop techniques for group projects, comment on the work
of others, and integrate themselves deeply into digital creativity.
So, we have reached an ironic or perhaps perverse point-one
where the cultural sensitivities of much of the artistic and creative world,
as well as the cultural claims of average citizens owning digital
equipment, are no longer in sync with the world of copyright law-a
world that itself helped legitimate appropriation. Congress and the
courts have responded to the deluge of digital copying by pulling back on
the Betamax decision and the culture it helped create. The Supreme
82. I do not claim to have a solid database for this proposition, but discussions with
faculty and students at Parsons: The New School for Design confirm it.
83. Apparently all sensibilities about protecting artistic integrity are under challenge.
Uriel Landeros has been accused of using spray paint and stencils to deface the Picasso painting
Woman in a Red Armchair while it was hanging at the Menil Collection in Houston, Texas.
Cicely Mitchell, Man Accused of Vandalizing Picasso Extradited to Houston, CBS Hous. (Jan.
14,2013), http://Houston.cbslocal.com/2013/01/14/man-accused-of-vandalizing-picaso-extraadited-
to-houson/. Landeros' act was caught on a smart phone and posted on YouTube at Vandal Spray
Paints Priceless Pablo Picasso Art Painting Woman in RedArmchair, Caught on Video, YouTuBE
(June 19, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMQm6HShz9U. According to a blog on
the Houston Press, Landeros absconded to Mexico after being charged with two felonies.
Terrence McCoy, Houston Art Vandal, Uriel Landeras, Planning an Art Show.- Milkng Every
Last Drop of Fame from Vandalism, Hous. PRESS (Oct. 8, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://blogs.houston
press.com/artattack/2012/10/uriellanderos-planning__arLshow.php. James Perez, a gallerist who
has mounted a show of Landeros' work called Houston, We Have a Problem, reportedly said that
the defacement was like a remix. "It's just taking something and making it your own.... I like
what Uriel did. That makes it yours." Allan Kozinn, Art Show forAccusedPicasso Vandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2012), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/picasso-vandal-gets-his-
own-art-show/. To say the least, the analogy is troubling.
84. The communal, cooperative ways in which artistic work now is produced online are
legion. Collaborative art projects present an array of copyright problems not covered in this
Article, which is mostly about the nature of authorship and ownership of intellectual property
rights.
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Court pushed the Sony article-of-commerce analysis aside to find
Grokster-a provider of software allowing peer-to-peer file exchanges-
responsible under common law inducement theory."5 Major entertain-
ment businesses have constantly, and with much success, urged Congress
to take arguably draconian steps to suppress online copying.86 At times,
as in the case of some art appropriators, the chasm between the cultural
claims of artists and the legal claims of copyright owners is enormous.
One of the best examples of the chasm is represented by the work of
Shepard Fairey, the creator of the famous Obama "Hope" Poster.870 It is
not that he appropriated more blatantly or frequently than many other
artists-though the Obama poster is only the tip of the Shepard Fairey
appropriation iceberg; he is just an appropriation artist who hit the big
time. 90 The most important point for my purposes is not his perhaps
fleeting fame, but how he describes his work. When speaking about
using the work of others he does not credit, he calls the appropriated
images "references."" This is very clever-and also very revealing of the
appropriation frame of mind.
So what is to be done about all of this? One response, of course, is
nothing. That is more like inserting heads in the sand than it is an effort
to thoughtfully respond to the cultural trends. The digital genie cannot be
put back in the cultural bottle, even if some are desperately trying to do
so. Nonetheless, both sides of the debate make telling points. Copyright
owners claim that their materials are being unfairly used in ways that
previously provided royalty streams."0 Copyright owners presumably will
continue to pursue those who they think are unlawful appropriators and
will sometimes win big judgments and shut down major file sharing
websites. Copyright users complain that such enforcement efforts
inappropriately constrain their freedom. They opine that suppression is
85. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
86. The most important example is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
For a summary of its provisions, see The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: US.
Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/
legislation/dmca.pdf.
87. See Appropriation At: Law and Culture, supra note 2, at 51 (http://www.rhchused.
com/Page5 l.html).
88. Id. at 52 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page52.html).
89. See, e.g., William W Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 HAR.
J.L. & TECH. 243, 270-75 (2012).
90. The most recent contest is over whether digital rights management (DRM) capacities
should be built into the next version of HTML-the standard coding system for writing
webpages. The issues are described in a paper written by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
EFF Makes Formal Objection to Druin HTM 15, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 29, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-makes-formal-objection-drm-html5.
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likely to be both a hopeless and misdirected battle over the long haul and
a serious limitation on the creative energies of those who fairly use
modem technology. It is hopeless because digital copying is very
difficult, if not impossible, to suppress. It is misdirected because
suppression of access to websites, service providers, and files ignores the
high level of creativity generated by the openness of the Internet.9 ' Nor
does it easily accommodate traditional users' rights of fair use and
browsing inherent in the compromises that have long strengthened
support of copyright law.92 So the cultural and linguistic divisions
between those clamoring for stricter copyright laws and those demanding
a wide-open Web are at a standoff. The debates sometimes echo the Dr.
Seuss story about the north-going Zax and the south-going Zax, where
both sides are right!93
The use of one-on-one litigation to suppress digital copying is often
inefficient and costly to both sides in the debate. Tracking down those
digitally using materials in ways that violate existing law is expensive
and often unsuccessful. Enforcement costs are high, causing particularly
harsh consequences for smaller creative enterprises. Steps taken by
Congress and some nations around the world to suppress digital file
storage, copying, and sharing have driven some practices underground or
overseas, or have forced practitioners to run from digital hiding place to
digital hiding place like fleeing felons (which some of them may be).
Actions to place materials behind paywalls have worked in some settings,
though once a work has been purchased it is often easy for the buyer to
post it online outside a paywall. But all of these steps have failed to stem
the reuse tide while imposing significant costs on traditional copyright
norms.
The "takedown" system is a perfect example of the costs now being
imposed on both copyright owners and users. Under the extant regime,
91. The classic article on this point is Jonathan Zittrain, The Genemtive Interne4 119
HARv. L. REv. 1974 (2006).
92. The framing of these issues is best done in a series of articles by Jessica Litman: The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); The Exclusive Right To Rea4 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); and Readers'Coyrigh4 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 325 (2011).
93. The Zax is one of four stories in DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES
(1961). The Z7ax involves two creatures-the north-going Zax and the south-going Zax-
walking toward each other across the wilderness and stubbornly refusing to move out of each
other's way. They stay in place as the world develops around them, still standing face-to-face as
the tale ends with buildings and highways swirling over their heads. The relevance of Dr. Seuss's
imagery to law was made clear in a symposium held on that very subject on March 1, 2013, at
New York Law School. My introduction to that event-Exploning Civil Society Through the
Writings of Dr Seuss--may be found at Richard Chused, Dr Seuss as a Vehicle.- An
Introduction, 58 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 495 (2014).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) (describing the "notice and take down" system).
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Internet hosting services and media posting systems like YouTube must
take down infringing materials once they are notified of its presence on
their servers." Though the Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for certain
Web services when their users first post materials online, the offending
items must be removed when the services are notified that protected
items have been posted. Millions of takedown notices are received from
copyright owners every week around the world. 6 Sending and handling
them has become a major and costly nightmare for both copyright
owners and hosting companies. In addition to the enormous volume of
notices, the system is a cat-and-mouse game. As quickly as one JRL is
taken down, another will pop up. Taking down entire file sharing sites
produces similar results, with new locations replacing the defunct ones.
Even if file sharing sites are forced off the Internet, there is no practical
way for those claiming infringement to recover damages from a
judgment-proof company no longer taking in ad revenues or membership
fees. It simply is not surprising that digital copying is endemic in both
the worlds of creative artists and intellectual property consumers. A
huge amount of material is taken for free in the wild world of the Web.
On the other side of the debate, when systems designed to suppress
digital copying do work, they sometimes function inappropriately.
Takedown notices are sent erroneously or for less than salutary reasons.
They may lead to removal of materials that should be left alone.97 Most
significantly, efforts to suppress online illegality generally operate with
minimal deference to fair use rights or the traditional ability of
consumers to browse among protected works before deciding whether to
purchase an item.98 Additionally, when items go behind paywalls, those
selling copyrighted materials are unable and unwilling to distinguish
between those intending to fairly use material, those browsing to find
material to support their creative activity, and those unlawfully intending
to pass copies along to others for free or for a fee.
95. Id.
96. The load is staggering for Google. Google received almost 35,000,000 requests to
take down URLs during September 2014 alone! See Transparency Repot GOOGLE, http://www.
google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
97. Perhaps the most important study is Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient
Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyight Act, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://static.chillingeffects.org/Urban-Quilter-512-summary.
pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
98. One of the first to raise these issues was David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000). See also Julie E. Cohen, A
Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28
CoNN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
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All of this makes it understandable why much of the contemporary
debate about copyright tends to sound like the north-going Zax and the
south-going Zax. Each has valid arguments that fail to dissuade the
other. Efforts to find common ground within the parameters of the
existing copyright regime appear doomed to failure. This all suggests
that copyright law itself must be rethought in basic and fundamental
ways. A path must be found for both the north-going Zax and the south-
going Zax to mutually use the same ground-for both copyright owners
and copyright users to accommodate their mutual needs while still
obtaining benefits from the operation of copyright law.99
IV. THE DIGITAL FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
There are a number of important issues that must be resolved before
copyright law can exist comfortably in the digital world. First, are there
areas of extant copyright law that function reasonably well? If so,
creating an interface between those areas and the digital world is critical.
Second, once past the large observation already made that cabining
digital copying is difficult, if not impossible, without using draconian
methods to suppress abuse, what rights may realistically be retained by
those creating original works of authorship that are either in the digital
world from the beginning or can be easily moved there? Third, if
copyright owners who have lost effective control over digital versions of
their work may still be entitled to some form of remuneration, is there
any way to establish a payment system that avoids the problems
discussed in this Article? Fourth, because the very nature of both the
Internet and the growing array of devices capable of digitizing material
seriously diminishes the ability of intellectual property owners to manage
use of their works, what should be done with the traditional rule that
copyright owners control the right to make and distribute derivative
works? Finally, what impact does fair use have on the reconstruction of
copyright law in the digital age?
To work through these issues, consider a traditionally formed
copyrightable work of art that is the focus of the opening segments of this
Article. With the permission of my wife, Elizabeth Langer, I will use a
work we both like a great deal that is original to her. It is a figure
99. 1 certainly am not the first to claim that the existing copyright statute needs to be
substantially, if not totally, rewritten. Two recent articles make the issue obvious by their titles
alone. See Justin M. Kaufman, The Creative Rights Act of2020: A New Deal for Promoting the
Progress of Creativity, Soc. Sci. RESEARCH NETWORK, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?
abstractid=2135862 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014); Jessica Litman, The Copyight Revision Act of
2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 249 (2009).
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composition in acrylic paint and chalk called Holding On, displayed in
color on the next page and on her art website.'°°0 As with many creative
endeavors, it has relatives and aesthetic ancestors in the history of
Western art. But she did not literally appropriate anyone else's material
when she made it.'"' It easily fits into the existing copyright world-an
original work fixed in a tangible medium of expression that obviously is
copyrightable subject matter. In its first incarnation the work was not
digitized. But after taking a digital photo of the work, she asked me to
place it on her webpage-as a practical matter diminishing her ability to
effectively control its Internet future. So what should be the intellectual
property status of Holding On? Are there aspects of its "life" that can be
dealt with reasonably well under existing law? What rules should govern
the digital use, reuse, distribution, alteration, and remixing of the work?
What arenas of control, if any, should my wife retain now that a digital
image of the composition is online? Should she have access to any
royalty stream if the painting is digitally copied, reused, altered, or
redistributed, either with or without her permission?
100. See Holding On, ELIZABETH LANGER, http://www.elizabethlanger.com/figuresI0.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
101. Perhaps this needs some clarification. She made this work in part from a picture in a
newspaper. The end product is unrecognizably different from the original. If you want to call that
appropriation, be my guest. And of course, the idea of painting or drawing a figure starting from
a model or another picture is as old as the earliest human art forms.
[Vol. 17
LEGAL CUL TURF OFAPPROPRIA TIONAR T
Elizabeth Langer, Holding On (Acrylic and Chalk on Paper, 30" x 30")
A. More of the Same Ol Same Old?
Does the existing copyright scheme work well with Holding On?
Surely the answer is "yes." If we return to those thrilling days of
yesteryear, before the rise of the Web, copyright law dealt with two-
dimensional art reasonably well."2 Standard reuse or copying of the
original to make, display, or distribute nondigital versions of the work
were and are dealt with tolerably under the existing structure.
Enforcement certainly is not perfect. Discovering nondigital infringe-
102. Pardon my appropriation. Some readers may remember the yesteryear line from the
TV series The Lone Ranger. "Return with us now to those thrilling days of yesteryear! From out
of the past come the thundering hoof beats of the great horse Silver! The Lone Ranger rides
again!" So intoned the narrator as the show began. A radio version premiered in 1933. Its
popularity generated an equally popular television series that ran from 1947 to 1959. You can
view the introduction at The Lone Ranger. 75th Anniversary DVD Box Set Trailer, YouTuBE
(Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Fe5nD7BEBIY
2014]
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ment has always been a problem. Enforcement costs have long
precluded some from pursuing infringers. Protecting Holding On in the
analog world presents no greater or lesser problems than have existed for
over a century. If inappropriate use of the work comes to light, demand
letters and perhaps litigation are available to obtain relief. While
enforcement costs can be high, the Copyright Act lightens the burdens
for some by making statutory damages available when actual harm is
difficult to measure and allowing courts to award attorney fees to
prevailing parties.' °3  In addition, the likelihood of nondigital
infringement is very low for material like two and three-dimensional fine
art. After all, the artist or other party holding the work retains control
over access to the unique original object that others may wish to copy, at
least until it is shown publicly.
On the other side of the equation-those wishing to use works like
Holding On in their own creative or mundane endeavors-obstacles to
creative reuse in the nondigital world are not intolerably difficult to
overcome. " Obtaining permission may not always be easy, but tracking
down a copyright owner in the absence of notice and registration
requirements, seeking permission once the owner is identified, and
paying any requested fees are generic hurdles in the copyright world that
have existed for a very long time. They simply are part and parcel of the
way the United States, and most other nations, have dealt with
intellectual property rights in a nondigital world for generations. The
system has never been perfect. Transaction costs for enforcing rights or
obtaining permission to use works have never been zero. But in the
nondigital world these transaction costs are not so high that they break
the system. Such enforcement costs are similar to those extant in many
private property schemes. This is true not only in the fine arts realm, but
also in many other areas where use of digital systems is incomplete. Live
performances of drama, dance, music, and comedy, and publication of
hard copy books and other works, to suggest a few, are significantly less
likely to become digitized than works originally created and distributed
online. In short, standard copyright rules, normal permission processes,
103. These remedies are available in settings where a work has been registered. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 412, 504-505 (2012).
104. It is true that the permissions system under the Copyright Act is a major transaction
cost. That is a standard criticism of copyright law that deserves consideration. But this long-
standing issue does not arise because of digitization. It was here well before the Web arrived.
The arrival of digitization, however, has vastly exacerbated the problem by dramatically
expanding both the volume of copyrighted material and the ease of its distribution.
188 [Vol. 17
2014] LEGAL CULTURE OFAPPROPRIATIONART 189
and one-on-one lawsuits provide adequate, if imperfect, protection for
many traditional creative endeavors.'05
B. Entry into the Digital World
As a result, there clearly is a transition problem-how to treat the
movement of a protected work from a nondigital to a digital
environment. The two worlds present dramatically different situations
for both copyright owners and users. Though it is plausible to think
about a traditional artist maintaining intellectual property control over
her work in a nondigital realm, there is no guarantee that such control
will last very long once a work is publicly displayed or digitized.
Holding On might be digitized in a variety of ways---either by the artist
or by someone else. Pictures may surface after the work is shown at an
exhibition. Copies could be circulated if the artist uses it in an email, on
a social networking site or, as in real life, on a website.' 6 While going
viral is unusual, there is little to prevent its occurrence in a variety of
settings. My wife could place the image behind a secure, password
protected wall, but that would defeat the purposes she has for putting the
image online in the first place. Artists routinely set up websites and use
images-often, but not always, thumbnails-in emails and in social
media to spread knowledge of their talents. Nonuse of electronic
systems is quickly becoming the exception rather than the rule, even in
the most traditional parts of the artistic world. In short, it is obvious that
the forms of control available over art in a nondigital world are easily lost
by the normal day-to-day digitizing behavior of either the artist or those
seeing her work. Even if continued use of traditional copyright law can
be justified in nondigital settings, the profound structural change created
by digital devices and the Internet thrusts a surprising question upon the
105. Obviously, I am not suggesting that the standard copyright regime is all that great-
only that the structure of the Copyright Act provides tolerably good protection to creative artists in
nondigital realms while allowing arguably appropriate levels of use by others seeking either fair
or licensed use. This Article is not designed to deal with any number of long-standing criticisms
of the Copyright Act's operation in the nondigital realm. Attempting to grapple with some of
these issues here would send me down an enormous frolic and detour. The "orphan work"
problem alone-exposed for all to see by litigation against Google Books-is big enough to write
many monographs about. Three recent articles on these issues include Giancarlo E Frosio,
Google Books Rejected- Taking the Orphans to the Digital Public Library of Alexaudna, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 81 (2011); Libby Greismann, The Greatest Book
You Will Never Read Public Access Rights and the Orphan Works Dilemma, 11 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 193 (2012); James Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlemen4 58 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'v 497 (2011).
106. For example, my wife frequently places an image below the signature line of her
emails. Though not yet using Facebook, we have discussed whether it is worth maintaining an
open art page there in addition to her regular website.
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intellectual property world: should an artist retain the right to control
entry of her work into the digital domain? Or, put in more standard
copyright prose, should a copyright owner have the exclusive right to
control initial display or distribution of a literal digital copy of a work to
a third party or to the world on the Internet?' °7 The quick, stock answer is
yes. In reality, however, the question is surprisingly difficult and presents
deep challenges to standard copyright norms.
In the absence of fair use, the owner of a traditional copyright in an
artwork holds control over the first publication or display of her work.'0
Standard justifications for the existence of copyright-the utilitarian
notion that some level of incentive for the making of original work is
required for society to obtain an appropriate amount of creativity or the
natural rights idea dominating European law that creativity deserves
reward for its own sake-support that result.' 9 Display and publication
of a painting or other traditional artwork are standard ways to seek
payment and reward for creativity from interested purchasers.
Preempting such actions by seizing control over first digital use
challenges the vitality of traditional, core copyright values. Therefore, at
first glance, it is instinctively appropriate to conclude that a copyright
owner should retain the right to control the introduction of a work into
the digital world, especially if that owner is also the creative force behind
the work.
It turns out, however, that granting a copyright owner complete
control over the transition to digital is extremely difficult to defend as the
only available remedy for infringement. While allowing a copyright
owner to obtain relief from those who digitize a work without permission
is worth inserting into any new or substantially amended copyright code,
such a rule may at times be of little use. Surreptitious digitization is easy.
107. 1 am totally putting aside issues associated with some varieties of online copies, such
as caching, temporary or fleeting storage, and other similar problems associated with the
operation and maintenance of the Internet. They are in an arena not covered in this Article.
108. First publication rights were central to the fair use analysis in Harper& Row, Inc. V
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1979). Without appropriate permissions, The Nation published
excerpts from an autobiography of Gerald Ford after obtaining a prepublication copy of the book
in an arguably suspect way. Harper & Row had previously contracted with Time, Inc., to publish
important excerpts from the book just prior to its release. The value of that contract was nullified
by The Nation's actions. When sued, The Nation unsuccessfully claimed fair use. See id
(describing why The Nation's use was not fair under the Copyright Act).
109. There is a great deal of literature on the norms underlying copyright. Two of the most
interesting are Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 92, and Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). The first concentrates on the difficulties inherent in a utilitarian
incentive based theory of copyright and the second on issues surrounding claims of right in the
creative spirit.
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Use of cameras, recording devices, and other digital tools is sometimes
barred at exhibitions, shows, and public events.'0  But posting a no-
camera rule on a wall or reciting it over a public address system and
enforcing it are altogether different undertakings. Bag and body searches
can be done but the hassles associated with taking devices from
customers, storing them during a show, and returning them later to
owners-to say nothing of objections by patrons to physical intrusions
and to temporary separation from their expensive digital gadgets-are
major impediments to use of such measures. If patrons are not required
to store their digital devices, it is often impossible to impose limits on use
of cameras and recording equipment. Many places, including galleries
and museums filled with copyrighted works and entertainment spots
where music and other protected works are performed, have simply given
up trying.'' And in museums or other institutions that have not given up,
the no-camera policy may be widely ignored."'r
110. Copyright law, of course, is not the only area placed under strain by the digital world.
One example is the recent privacy invasion hullabaloo surrounding the topless pictures of Kate
Middleton taken by a photographer for a French version of Closer, their later publication in Irish,
Italian, and Norwegian publications, the further distribution of the photos around the Internet, and
the failure of injunctive relief issued by a French court against the original digitizer to stem the
tide. See Alan Cowell, Royals Sue over Photos of Duchess, Top Bareg N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2012, at A4; Elisabetta Povoledo, Magazine Publishes Images of British Duchess, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/world/Europe/Italian-magazine-publishes-
topics-images-of-Kate-Middleton.html. It seems quite clear that if control over privacy invasions
is to be maintained, the size of damage remedies has to take into account the ease with which
material may go viral. Injunctions, as in the Middleton dispute, may be of limited utility. A
significant damage award, however, may have deterred future similar events.
111. For example, the general rule at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York bars
flash photography and video cameras, but nonflash pictures may be taken. Further limitations
may be imposed for special exhibitions. See Visitor Tips and Policies, METRO. MUSEUM ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/visit/plan-your-visit/visitor-tips-and-policies (last visited Oct. 6,
2014). Though reuse of images taken at the museum is barred, that is quite difficult to enforce.
Flash photography is also barred at the Museum of Modem Art in New York. Taking pictures for
personal use is allowed. Visitors Policies, MUSEUM MODERN ART, http://www.moma.org/visit/
plan/guidelines (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). The ability to take very good digital pictures indoors
without flash has only added to the difficulties of controlling distribution of copyrighted works in
the digital age. Despite the hassles, some venues, including Madison Square Garden and Lincoln
Center, bar large bags and prohibit photography with "professional" equipment. Guest
Relations/FAQ, GARDEN, http://www.thegarden.com/faq.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
Presumably, consumer cameras like those found in cell phones are allowed. Since 9/11, bag
searches on entry into important venues such as Lincoln Center are commonplace. However, this
usually is for security purposes, not to bar entry of digital devices. See, for example, the policy
for the Beacon Theater, a popular Manhattan venue for music and other shows. Patrons are
warned about bag searches but not cameras on the website. Beacon Theatre Tickets,
TICKETMASTER, http://www.ticketmaster.com/Beacon-Theatre-tickets-New-York/venue/237665
(last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
112. For example, in 2012, my wife and I visited the Guggenheim Museum to see the
Picasso Black and White Exhibition. As we entered the museum, "no camera" signs were visible
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Of course, once a digital copy is made, the cat may easily escape the
bag. And when it does, the owner may have no idea who was responsible
for the event. Perversely, the greater the owner's enforcement efforts, the
lower the likelihood of tracing the digitization pathway. Digitization is
more likely to be surreptitious when policing is intense. In some
settings, regardless of enforcement efforts, it is simply inevitable that
digitization will happen. The innocent, thoroughly reasonable actions of
a copyright owner-a simple act of publicly displaying or performing a
work-may be the precipitating cause for the transfer of a work from the
nondigital to the digital world. Everyone should recognize these
problems. The emergence of tiny digitizing devices and nonflash
cameras has allowed the reduced intellectual, artistic, and moral restraints
of the art appropriation era to move out of the home and studio and into
the world at large. The public display or performance of a work in any
format-not just paintings, but any type of creative object-risks its
transformation. To be creative in the present world is to risk being
digitized. It simply is the way the world now works.
There is no reason to blame or fault an artist, performer, or
copyright owner or to penalize them for their behavior if one of their
works is digitized without their approval or knowledge. But, ironically,
the structure of the digital world does seriously undermine the utility of
the traditional norm that copyright owners have the exclusive right to
exercise control over the first publication, display, or performance of
their works. To state or even enact the rule neither guarantees its
enforceability nor assures only authorized digitization. Even if the right
to control digitization is bestowed on copyright owners, a work digitized
without permission may be very difficult to recover. Sometimes it
simply becomes a digital "goner." Surely those dealing with copyright-
able subject matter are fully aware that their revelation of a work in any
form--even under serious access constraints-may send it flying off on
an unexpected digital journey. Digitization not only makes it more
difficult and impractical for rights owners to enforce their control over
in a number of spots. But the number of people using smartphones to snap shots throughout the
museum was large. The institution's website notes that picture taking for personal,
noncommercial use on the lobby floor is okay, but that use of cameras elsewhere is barred.
Frequently Asked Questions, GUGGENHEIM, http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/visit/faqs-
policies-and-procedures (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). That policy was obeyed more in the breach
than the reality. I was warned after taking one photo because I left the flash on. Later shots, some
in the view of guards, went unnoticed. Most people taking pictures were not stopped by members
of the staff regardless of where they were in the museum. It is not clear they would have
succeeded in squelching picture taking if they had been more vigilant. Welcome to the digital
world. You can see one of the shots I took from above the lobby floor at Appropriation Art. Law
and Culture, supra note 2, at 54 (http://www.rhchused.com/Page54.html).
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first digitization, but it also reduces the need for such enforcement if
some now untapped source of payment for reuse can be created. If a
work reaches a realm where recovery of control over its use by making a
legal claim under traditional copyright law is impractical, payment of
funds to the owner may become much more important than retention of
first digitization rights. Finding a way of making payment possible in
such circumstances is one of the major goals of this Article.
There is no perfect way to resolve these issues. But a more nuanced
and intelligent system of copyright remedies is possible: a system that
recognizes both the traditional economic claims of copyright owners and
the inability to control the ways in which works may be used online. I
suggest that once a digital version of a work is available online,
regardless of how it got there, the copyright owner should be given a
restricted choice between two mutually exclusive enforcement structures.
The artist should have a choice between relying on the traditional
copyright enforcement system in the digital world or opting into a pooled
royalty system that receives money from taxes on electronic equipment
and pays out funds to copyright owners based on digital use surveys.
Selecting the second system would be a natural step for an owner to take
after digital control over a work is lost."13 But the decision of a copyright
owner to admit that the digital world controls her work and to forego use
of traditional enforcement techniques also means that she must largely
cede use of her creativity to the remix world. It is, in short, a decision to
accept money in return for releasing control over the digital use of a work
to others. The rest of this Article describes these two pathways in
detail-the restraints on use of each system, the remedies available to
owners, and the place of fair use and moral right in such a restructured
copyright world.
1. The Limits of Traditional Remedies in the Digital World
As noted, there are situations where traditional copyright remedies
might work tolerably well even in the digital age. There is therefore no
reason to totally abandon them. If a copyright owner knows the
unlicensed digitization pathway of a work not previously placed on a
digital system under the auspices of the copyright owner, a remedy
should be provided against the appropriate parties. This rule would have
to be imbedded in a new exclusive right to control the first digitization of
113. Note that selection of a royalty-pooling system does not interfere with an artist's
ability to sell an original work. The object-painting, sculpture, collage, or other medium-is not
affected by a restructuring of digital copyright law.
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a work, though subject to the limitations described below."4 There are a
number of reasons why statutory damages should be the preferred
remedy in any case where digitization of a work is widespread. While a
person placing the work of another online may be misbehaving when she
acts, it is unfair to impose the harm caused by all subsequent viral use on
the first miscreant. At the time of litigation it may be totally unclear how
much further use will be made of the work. Measuring damages in such
a setting would be impossible. In addition, even if the original party
digitizing material misbehaved, that would also describe the actions of
those using the protected material later on. Blaming the total use level on
the first to digitize is causally inappropriate. Given both the measure-
ment difficulties and the causation issues, it makes more sense to set a
payment level range of damages for the first unauthorized digitization."5
If a copyright owner knows the unlicensed digitization pathway of a work
unlawfully placed on a digital system without the auspices of the
copyright owner and it is feasible to un-digitize the work, an injunctive
remedy should also be provided. This may happen, for example, when a
digital image of a painting or other work is on a small number of cameras
or computers but not yet on the Web or a digital version is on very few
websites and apparently not widely distributed.
At the point where digital distribution has proliferated to such an
extent that use of traditional copyright remedies to control digital
publication, display, or performance of a work becomes impractical,
however, it is sensible to reconstruct the copyright regime to allow an
owner to forego access to standard remedies and seek remuneration from
a generalized royalty-pooling system."6 Inherent in this decision is the
114. Some care is required in stating this idea, for copyright owners often digitize a work
when they create it. Writing a document on a computer, "painting" a work on a screen, or placing
a musical composition on a storage medium all involve access to digital systems. The issue dealt
with in the text is the placement of a work on a digital system outside the direct reach of the
copyright owner.
115. Consideration should also be given to removing the requirement that a work be
registered in order to obtain statutory damages for its infringement in viral use cases. Digital
misuse can happen so rapidly and unexpectedly that long-term planning requirements may be
unfair.
116. Clearly there are settings in which work is digitized and posted online but further
copies are not likely to be made in the absence of sophisticated hacking. Large databases, for
example, obtain copyright protection for their original organization and presentation, but not for
their content. The underlying data, as in systems like Westlaw or Lexis, are stored behind major
control systems. Any copyright interests in these systems are very unlikely to go viral, both
because of the underlying control systems and because the materials are not likely to become
wildly popular, viral fads. There are other systems, like iTunes, which sell copyrighted material in
a tightly secured market that does not guarantee the digital status of the work after it is
downloaded. Much of the music on the site is not copyright protected. In addition, the songs
may be available on other sites or redistributed despite any precautions and limitations imposed
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assumption that efforts by an owner to control distribution of her work
are no longer useful or economically productive. Rather than seeking
compensation from numerous and potentially unknown or unreachable
users of the work, the owner would allow general online use of the work
in return for receiving a monetary stream from a royalty pool. Loss of
control over digitization should not mean forfeiture of all revenue
streams.
There are at least two potential problems with this proposal worth
considering before reviewing the structure of the royalty-pooling system.
First, drawing the line between settings where control over digitization
rests with the copyright owner and those in which control has been lost is
not precise. It is a potential litigation magnet if statutorily mishandled.
The easiest course is to place the decision about choice of remedial
structure in the hands of the copyright owner. Rather than leaving the
transition from traditional to pooled remedy under judicial control, the
line should be drawn by the copyright owner-the party most directly
concerned with the remedial structure. At the point where the artist
deems it appropriate to withdraw from the traditional copyright system
and seek pooled royalties, she should simply be allowed to make the
shift.' 17
Second, the system proposed here may create incentives for
misbehavior. The existence of a rule allowing copyright owners to shift
enforcement from the courts to a royalty-pooling system may lead some
to become habitual hackers in order to increase the availability of
materials in the online world."8 We cannot be certain this would happen.
But assuming the probability is very high, should we worry about the
potential consequences? Two reasons lead me to answer no. First,
similar, though perhaps less enticing, incentive structures operate now.
As already noted, copyright law itself allows a significant amount of
copying as part of fair use. Google, for example, is arguably the largest
by iTunes. In such settings, the pooling system proposed in this Article might well be selected by
a copyright owner.
117. In fact, there is no reason to limit the choice by imposing some statutory norm. If a
copyright owner wishes to seek pooled royalties and allow a work to be freely remixed from the
outset, I see no important policy reason to bar that behavior.
118. It is worth noting that this incentive may be quite low. If, as I propose here, funds to
pay for digital use should be raised by taxing electronic equipment, the costs of digital reuse
would be passed on to the public at large. Hackers might actually realize that their work would
create pressure to increase the tax rate to make the size of royalty streams fair. That is not the sort
of free-for-the-taking atmosphere that drives contemporary hackers. In addition, "click cheating"
by copyright owners to increase their royalty streams is controllable. Search engines have
developed sophisticated methods to deal with the same problem in setting advertising rates and
payments.
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appropriator on the Internet. With court approbation, "9 it makes available
book excerpts, image thumbnails, and an array of other copyrighted
materials in its search results. In addition, while the threat of litigation
now deters some digital redistributors, there is much evidence that the
effect is limited. The proliferation of copyrighted materials on the
Internet certainly belies the notion that extant law has successfully
squelched appropriation.
Second, and more importantly, the existence of unauthorized
appropriation of copyrighted material in a world where litigation is
rejected in favor of a pooled royalty does not mean that copyright owners
go home empty-handed. The empty pocket is the fear driving much of
the antagonism of large entertainment companies to digital
redistributions on the Internet. Perhaps they are being shortsighted. As
discussed at length below, there are ways to structure compensation
systems in an open digital environment, and there is no reason to believe
that digital duplication must cause economic harm to owners. In fact,
there is reason to believe that many owners would be better off by getting
out of the enforcement business and into the pooled royalty collection
trade. Digital uses of copyrighted materials that presently produce no
income stream would become money conduits in any structure that
monitors distribution and provides use-based compensation. Though it is
a perverse conclusion to anyone wedded to present practices, a world that
allows or even encourages digital duplication may lead to a better and
more efficient royalty-streaming structure than now exists. '
2. Royalty Pooling
Where does all of this lead? How should we respond to the changes
in the economics of the copyright world wrought by the Internet? Those
who complain loudly about the slow movement of large entertainment
enterprises to reinvent their business models may be right. But to
whatever degree financial reward for the use of prized creative work is
lost to the vagaries of the digital world, distribution of funds to copyright
owners, especially the small cogs in the large entertainment wheel, may
be appropriate. My claim that we should allow copyright owners to cede
119. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 E3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007);
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 902 F Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Authors Guilddoes not involve Google, but
very strongly suggests that what Google presents online in its book searches is permitted.
120. It also is plausible to imagine the creation of a "miscreant" rule to handle those who
are large-scale redistributors of materials placed in a royalty-pooling system. Royalty-pooling
organizations could be given the authority to seek damage and injunctive relief from such parties.
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control over the digital distribution, display, or performance of works
easily available online, does not negate the validity of claims by those
owning copyrights for compensation when their work is used. No one
interested in copyright issues should wish to undermine the already
tenuous ability of many truly creative and artistic people to make a
living. That is one reason why the traditional infringement rules have
remained in place for so long. My suggestion that the scope of control
over copyrightable material now held by authors and copyright owners is
too large collides directly with the need to find sources of financial
support for the artistic among us. Resolution of this tension is likely to
upset deeply engrained business models and legal habits.
Any new copyright system must operate under a set of basic
constraints. First, as noted, copyright owners, as a practical matter,
sometimes lose control over the digital use of their work. Rather than
forego virtually all royalty streams, owners must get accustomed to the
idea of giving up control of their work in return for obtaining benefits
under a royalty-pooling system. Second, once a work is in the digital
realm and control over its digital use is ceded by the copyright owner, it
should be freely available for anyone to use-subject only to non-
copyright-based legal limitations 2' and, as discussed below, a
significantly revised moral right. Third, once a copyright owner has
ceded control over a work, it should be unlawful for anyone else to place
it behind a security system, paywall, or other system constraining access
by the general community. Those electing to remain in the traditional
copyright system should have to bear the enforcement costs of that
decision. Double dipping would be inappropriate.
A system meeting these goals could be set up in at least two ways.
First, we could emulate the process for covers of music compositions and
operate in a world where, subject to payment of a statutorily mandated
fee, anyone would be allowed to use another's copyrighted work once the
copyright owner has either ceded digital control of a work or, more
ambitiously, once it is digitized for the first time with the permission of
the copyright owner. That sort of system would require a pervasive
digital monitoring system using something like universal product codes
to detect which protected items are being used by others and to send out
bills to users.'22 Relying on statutory rights to do the equivalent of
making a cover without intensive monitoring is unlikely to work in an
online world. But such a monitoring system does not now exist. Pushing
12 I. Defamation is one obvious constraint.
122. This is the sort of system recommended in Kaufman, supra note 99.
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for its creation would raise a host of practical, intriguing, and perhaps
scary issues. Deploying the technology would be expensive.
Maintaining privacy would be difficult with a system that continually
monitors the Internet for use of copyrighted materials and sends bills to
users. In short, we should search for a better way. '
Second, we could forget about mandating direct monitoring of
product codes and billing users, create a pool of royalty funds by taxing
the sale of all digital equipment of any sort,'24 and distribute payments
through semi-public royalty-pooling organizations much like Sound
Exchange and the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP).'23 The tax system must be pervasive. Everything
digital-such as computers, blank media, routers, network servers and
equipment, smartphones, tablets, and television equipment of all types-
should have a fee attached to its sale. The Copyright Office should have
the authority to issue regulations determining the tax rate. It should also
be given the power to add any new equipment type it thinks appropriate
to the system without further legislative action.'26 Given the rapidity of
technological change, it would be foolish to require congressional action
to alter the mix of devices subject to taxation or to change the tax rate. '27
123. 1 reject the proposal that Fisher suggested a decade ago for the sound recording realm.
See FiSHER, supra note 17. In the present setting, the scale of the Internet makes tracking millions
of particular items an extraordinarily difficult task. It seems much more practical to create groups
of users willing to share revenues in some rough proportion to the ways the creativity of the group
members is digitized and distributed on the Internet.
124. It is also plausible to tax Internet service providers (ISPs) or other major players in the
Internet transmission system in addition to taxing equipment. I suspect that is unwise. While
ISPs and other organizations certainly are major players in the distribution and display of
copyrighted works, they also purchase or rent a significant amount of digital equipment. There is
no obvious reason why they should be taxed twice-once for the equipment and again for their
internet role. It is hard to understand why additional fees should be imposed for the services they
provide when such fees would not be imposed on other Internet-related businesses.
125. Moving to such a system would require public tolerance of imperfections inherent in
royalty-pooling systems. Those paying taxes when they buy digital equipment probably would
not be charged exactly in proportion with the amount of digital copying and remixing they do,
and those whose material is copied or remixed would not receive payments from royalty pools
that exactly match the extent to which their copyrighted items are actually used. We now tolerate
these imperfections in an array of areas, including music streaming, distribution of television
programming, and distribution of music composition performance royalties. There is no
particular reason to suspect that our willingness to accept imprecision would suddenly become an
issue if we moved to a tax-and-pay system for the digital world.
126. For example, questions would arise about whether new, fancy refrigerators with
computer screens in the doors should be taxed. While I think they should, that decision would be
left to the Copyright Office.
127. The United States has a history of adopting piecemeal legislation as new technology
arises. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 is a perfect example of the imperfections of such
actions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012). It was originally adopted to control the use of
digital audio tape recorders, a technology that quickly became obsolete. Though now being used
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Should joining a royalty-pooling organization be left up to authors
and copyright owners? Those who prefer to release materials into the
online world without receiving payments should be congratulated for
their generosity and allowed to abstain from joining a royalty-pooling
group. Organizations seeking to obtain and distribute part of any royalty
pool should be required to apply to the Copyright Office for approval to
participate in the system. Decisions about the amount of the royalty pool
to be given to each organization for distribution to its members would be
made using the same sort of process now operating in the cable and
satellite TV systems. Mediation and arbitration procedures are likely to
be the most efficient way to settle disputes between organizations or
among members of an organization seeking a share of a royalty fund. In
addition, each participating royalty-pooling organization should be given
the freedom to develop its own monitoring methods and royalty
allocation procedures. Authors and copyright owners, in turn, would
then be free to select which organization to join.128 In such a world, the
various pooling organizations in the system might create different
methods for monitoring digital use of materials and attracting members.
Some might actually require their members to agree to use product
codes. Others may not. In my view, this approach is superior to
establishing a centralized, probably government operated, mandatory
online monitoring and billing system.9 The preferences of copyright
owners would have a significant impact on the development of
monitoring methods and the operation of pooling organizations.
There are, of course, elephants in the room. One is the international
nature of the Web. If the United States adopted the pooled royalty
system described here, there is no guarantee that other large-scale users
of copyrighted material would follow suit. Works online under an
American pooled royalty system would, as a practical matter, be freely
available for use by international, as well as domestic, users. In the
absence of contributions to the royalty pool by overseas device taxes or
to mandate royalty payments for other technologies capable of copying music, there is no
particular reason to limit a royalty-pooling system to one particular form of entertainment. This
act, by the way, imposes a 2% tax on digital equipment capable of copying music to fund the
pool. Id. § 1003. So we do know how to do this sort of thing, even if only on a limited scale.
128. Some monitoring system organizations might elect to establish extensive monitoring
systems. Others may create less intrusive survey systems. Authors and copyright owners would
be free to select an organization or to move from organization to organization as they felt the
need.
129. Systems similar to this exist in various parts of the world, including Europe, Israel,
and Japan. See MARTIN KRETSCHMER, PRIVATE COPYING AND FAIR COMPENSATION: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT LEVIES IN EUROPE (2011), available at http://www.wipo.gov.uk/
jpresearch-faircomp-full-20111 0.pdf.
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other funding sources, Web users in other nations would simply be able
to use a work as they pleased. While I certainly hope that royalty pools
become common on the international scene, there are still steps the
United States could take to deal with overseas bleeding. The most useful
would be to bar collection in the United States of any copyright royalties
for domestic digital use of any online foreign work that is beyond the
ability of the foreign copyright owner to effectively control unless the
foreign state makes appropriate contributions to the American royalty
pool. The national treatment scheme of the Berne Convention and other
international copyright arrangements typically require each nation,
including the United States, to provide the same rights to both foreign
and domestic copyright owners in its domestic courts,'3° but the Internet
makes a mockery of such a system. Given the dramatic change in
technology over the last several decades, I suggest that the United States
would be justified in refusing to follow the traditional national treatment
system for works that have become "internationalized" on the Web.
While that would create an international tiff, the controversy would be
worthwhile. The same forces that are driving the need to change
copyright law in the United States are not isolated to these shores.
The other major issue is the inability to immediately know how
large the device tax should be. This is one of many reasons why the
Copyright Office must be given regulatory flexibility if it becomes the
governing authority. It is possible, however, to describe the standard that
should be used to develop a taxing system. Begin by contemplating how
major actors in the entertainment world would react to a royalty-pooling
system. Would they continue to rely on existing copyright enforcement
schemes or would they join a pooling group and give up attempting to
control what happens to their works online? If they elected to pool,
traditional methods of making money on creative works would have to be
eschewed. Would record companies, for example, prefer to hobble along
under extant rules or seek money from a pool? Would movie companies
130. In general, nations agreeing to be bound by the main international copyright
system-The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works-must provide
in their laws that foreign authors be given the same rights as domestic authors. Article 5(1)
provides:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this
Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which
their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the
rights specially granted by this Convention.
For the full text of the Berne Convention, see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?fileid=283698 (last visited Nov.
3,2014).
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continue to distribute their works under contractual constraints and
paywall systems or seek funds from a pool? My hope is that large
entertainment enterprises would elect to pool, thereby unleashing a
significant burst of digital creativity. And that should be the regulatory
goal as well. Tax levels should be set to produce a royalty pool large
enough to entice at least some of the major players in the entertainment
world to release their products into the wide world of the Web. At a
minimum the politics of this decision will be interesting. The probability
that taxes would be set high enough to produce the result I prefer may be
low, but that does not negate the wisdom of going forward anyway. The
measuring stick for deciding whether a pooling system works is not
whether most works owned by major players are moved into the new
regime. Any movement toward allowing largely unfettered use of online
works will likely enhance creativity, and many of those at the bottom of
the entertainment world pecking order-a place where enormous
creativity is now occurring-might be delighted to obtain any
remuneration for their work. At bottom, that is the goal-to enhance
creativity without significantly reducing the ability of copyright owners
to make a living.
The results for art appropriators and other remixers would be both
useful and interesting. Their payment for the digital equipment they use
would include a "tax"--in essence a fee for allowing them to access and
use copyrighted materials after they have been digitized and placed
online outside the control of copyright owners.'3 ' Once they pay these
fees, nothing further would need to be done. Much like a recording artist
making a cover, they could do as they wished with online digital
materials subject only to moral right limitations or other non-copyright-
based control systems.'32 Further permissions to freely reuse the digital
work of others would not be necessary. Fair use and copying would be
equally frictionless and both would be picked up by any monitoring
system established by royalty-pooling organizations and used to divvy up
funds.
A tax and pay system is not free of imperfections. Tax payments
will not be collected in exact proportion to the rate at which various
consumers use copyrighted materials, and royalties will not be paid in
131. It may make sense to ask those who have opted into a royalty-pooling organization to
place some sort of a marker on a digital copy of their work and to list their work in a central
online index managed by the Copyright Office. Whether those steps should be required is open
for debate. It might be preferable to leave such decisions to the rules established by royalty-
pooling organizations.
132. Nothing said here, of course, alters extant laws on defamation, trademark, or other
commercial rule.
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precise accordance with the digital use of protected works. The issue
posed is whether the imperfections are worth the significant reductions in
permissions friction and the increased creativity generated by a more
open Internet. To some extent we are quite accustomed to imperfections
like these. American society has distributed pooled royalties for decades
through performance rights societies like ASCAP, Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), and Sound Exchange, as well as under various pooling systems
for cable and satellite television and for digital audio recordings operated
by the Copyright Office. None of these groups distributes its funds with
completely accurate knowledge of use patterns. Each organization
receiving pooled royalties uses a different algorithm to distribute funds to
its members. Some usage levels can be tracked fairly accurately: radio
stations, cable networks, digital streaming systems, and others keep logs.
But usage rates that are not closely monitored must be determined by
surveys and educated guesses. Continuous cries of unfairness have not
been heard. For the most part, copyright owners are satisfied with
receiving imprecise royalty allocations rather than receiving little or no
remuneration for the use of their works or paying enforcement costs by
themselves.'33 The same sorts of procedures would be used to determine
online usage rates. What is new here is that most users use digital
equipment in different ways. Some download and remix digital materials
more than others. But there is a high probability that large users will
have fancier and more expensive equipment and, therefore, will pay more
in taxes when they make larger purchases. While the match is certainly
not perfect, the dissonance is not likely to be much greater than that
present in the royalty distribution systems we have used for decades.
C. Remix." Derivative Works in the Digital World
Implicit, and perhaps explicit, in the resolution of issues
surrounding initial digitization of a work and its literal online display,
performance, or distribution without permission is a need for changes in
traditional derivative work rules. Loss of control over a work in digital
form is not unusual and is often permanent; once it has gone off into the
wild world of the Web, there is little that can be done to prevent its
change and manipulation by others. That presents deep challenges to our
133. This is not to say that pooling society customers stay put forever. ASCAP and BMI,
for example, use different algorithms to distribute money. It is generally said that BMI favors
more established artists over newbies. There is a tendency, therefore, for some composers to
move to BMI later in their careers. The rise of computer tracking, however, has made it
somewhat easier for composers to control their own portfolios and contract with some services
privately. Competition between ASCAP and BMI has grown as a result.
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long-standing practice of giving control to copyright owners over the
making not only of copies, but also of derivative works. The Copyright
Act defines a derivative work as one that is "based upon one or more
preexisting works."'34  In general, under existing law, those making
original works have control, or licensing authority, not only over those
making copies of the originals, but also over those creating works derived
from the originals. That depth of control may have made sense in a
world where the process of making copies-even with permission-was
often arduous and difficult. But it is not always realistic in a digital
world. Given the way in which modem technology operates, the
statutory right of owners to veto many uses of their work sometimes
suppresses originality rather than encourages it, while still failing to halt
the creation of copies and derivative works without permission.
The costs imposed on both copyright users and copyright owners by
maintaining the existing derivative work rules in the digital world can be
enormous. Those users who prefer to do things lawfully need to ask
permission to use and alter prior material-a process that sometimes is
slow, inefficient, difficult, and costly. The enormous amount of digital
copyrighted property now extant in the world, the difficulties of tracking
its ownership, the slothful responses of copyright owners, and the
sometimes unjustifiably large fees requested make the entire permissions
game much more unwieldy than it was in a predigital world.' The use
of materials online without attribution to the original source makes
ownership tracking difficult, if not impossible, in some cases. On the
Internet, many works may appear to be orphaned even if they are not.
Perhaps the owner's identity may be found after some hard sleuthing, but
some people do not bother searching or find the process unavailing.
Those wishing to act with complete legality in their use of protected
digital work may not go forward either because of the license
requirements or the difficulties involved in finding owners and obtaining
permissions. Certainly the ability of risk averse artists to respond to on-
the-spot inspiration-a normal and common event on the Internet-is
suppressed by the potential need to obtain permission before doing
anything. In sum, the difficulties and problems involved in obtaining
permissions to copy and alter a work in the digital world encourage users
already addicted to the free-wheeling distribution of online materials to
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
135. 1 received my rude awakening the first time I sought permission from a number of
copyright owners for use of materials in a property textbook. It took months, many repetitive
phone calls, letters, and a series of negotiations with those seeking what I thought were high, and
sometimes outrageous, fees.
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both copy and remix without seeking permission. And those less willing
to take digital material may simply throw up their hands in frustration
and grab anyway. Given the ease of copying materials on the Web and
the difficulty and cost of seeking permission, the day-to-day world of the
Internet creates strong incentives to simply ignore copyright law and
remix as you wish.
None of this, of course, makes copyright owners very happy. Even
in settings where royalties should be paid under existing law, the
incentives created by the modem digital world frustrate both those
seeking to pay them and those searching for ways to compel their
remittance. Just as the permissions gauntlet frustrates users, owners find
it difficult to monitor the online use of specific works, obtain the identity
of potential infringers and seek relief. Therefore, we need to
significantly rethink the way power over derivative works is routinely
distributed under the Copyright Act. Not only is work subject to
unexpected and widespread online remixing, but the permissions process
itself can subvert the desires of owners and users alike to create a royalty
stream.
Questioning the wisdom of standard derivative work rules in the
online world is as challenging as recasting the traditional rule ceding
control over the initial distribution, duplication, and display of literal
digital copies to copyright owners. The same traditional copyright
rationales-the utilitarian notion that some incentive for the making of
original works is required for society to obtain an appropriate amount of
creativity or the natural rights idea that creativity deserves reward for its
own sake-supporting the right of owners to control the initial, literal
digitization of work also support their right to oversee digital remixing of
their copyrighted assets. Yet the difficulties created by the Internet also
suggest that both basic rules aren't always workable. Several issues arise.
First, how should reuse and derivative work issues mesh with the prior
suggestions about first digitization rights? Second, are there any
circumstances where derivative use should be limited or barred even after
the copyright owner loses control over the digitization of a work?
Finally, if the answer to the second question is yes, how should the ability
to limit or bar derivative use operate? Even if I am correct that it is
neither practical nor wise to give copyright owners complete control over
the digital reuse or alteration of their works online, there may be settings
where unbridled derivative use is inappropriate.
Basic copyright rules about digital derivative use should operate the
same as those governing initial digitization. If the initial digitization of a
painting, for example, creates a derivative work rather than a literal copy,
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there is no reason to change the baseline rules. The same concerns
justifying a right to control first literal use on digital system operate
when the initial use is derivative. Indeed, given the likelihood that literal
copying of a digital work sometimes precedes a remix, there is little
sense in setting up different digital regimes. When establishing baseline
rules, the simplicity of making digital changes in a work with a computer
or portable device makes it difficult, if not impossible, to manage a
distinction between digitally copying and remixing a work. As already
noted it often is easy to digitize and literally copy a work without the
knowledge of its owner. It is equally easy to change and manipulate it.
So if the digitization pathway to first use is known but the first use is
derivative, a statutory damage or injunctive remedy should be provided
to the copyright owner. Otherwise, once the initial reuse or derivation is
off on a Web journey, the copyright owner should be given a choice
between seeking traditional forms of relief and making recourse to the
generalized royalty-pooling system just described.
Despite these baseline rules, digital derivative use of a work may
present significantly more difficult challenges in the ways copyright law
meshes with related areas of media law than literal digital reuse.' 6 While
initial digitization of a work may undermine traditional copyright norms
as it gets duplicated online, further use or manipulation of a work
multiplies concerns if it is done in ways that offend the copyright owner
or embody changes to a work that the author finds inappropriate,
insulting, demeaning, or damaging. Nondigital examples are legion.
Images such as Holding On may be placed in a TV or online commercial
without permission, included in a political ad supporting people or
positions the artist finds disagreeable, used to insult the artist, or palmed
off as the work of another party.'3 These problems may involve other
doctrinal niches--defamation, trademark, publicity rights, unfair
competition, misappropriation, consumer protection, or moral right. Not
surprisingly, Internet-generated difficulties are surfacing in many areas.
Defamatory comments, once placed online, can have a snowball effect.
Trademarks or images of personalities, once digitized, can be reattached
to numerous products at the push of an enter key. Misleading consumers
online has become depressingly straightforward and simple. Similarly,
136. Digital reuse that is not derivative may present some of the same problems as those
about to be discussed. But since most of the examples involve derivations, it makes sense to
locate the discussion here.
137. These sorts of controversies have popped up with some regularity in the most recent
national campaign. For one of many stories about these issues, see Allison Brennan, Campaigns
Rock at Their Own Risk, CNN (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/politics/music-
in-campaigns/index.html.
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digital alterations of a copyrighted work that threaten its moral integrity
are easily sent off into the digital maelstrom. Alteration of traditional
copyright norms in the digital age may also suggest the need for changes
in some or all of these noncopyright arenas.3'
But in most of these situations, there is one significant, critical
distinction from viral reuse of digital works. The multiplication of digital
copies or remixes of a work on numerous websites leads to loss of
control over the very core of value protected by copyright law: the
exclusive rights to distribution, display, and performance. Once a work
floats around the Internet, obtaining relief from a single source-if one
can be found-becomes impractical. Suing multiple, often unknown,
parties is nearly impossible. The only way to provide the copyright
owner with an appropriate remedy for multiple instances of digital
distribution and remixing is to establish a payment system unrelated to
traditional distribution methods, contractual customs, and royalty
structures. At some point, measuring the scale of a work's use over
potentially lengthy periods of time and providing payment for it becomes
more important than holding all involved individuals responsible to the
copyright owner for their potentially infringing actions.' Nor is it
critical that a measure of damages be fully decided upon when a suit is
filed. Use levels of copyrighted works are unpredictable, and as a result,
it is often better to pay out income over time from a royalty pool. As we
know from existing royalty-pooling systems operated by the likes of
ASCAP and Sound Exchange, such payment schemes are possible.'4 °
But in the other areas of media law mentioned above, there is more
likely to be a single, identifiable, originating source for a problem and the
issue is likely to be more limited in time. Even if a derogatory image has
spread wildly over the Web, there is probably one party to seek out and
sue for damages. While recovering the copyrighted image may not be
possible, relief may be sought against the party setting a problem such as
defamation in motion. It typically is one person or company that illicitly
138. This Article deals almost entirely with issues in the United States. But the problems
obviously are international in scope. As noted previously, the sorts of shifts recommended here
also infer the need for changes in the Berne Convention and other international copyright
agreements.
139. Nothing said here reduces the ability of authorities to pursue criminal actions against
digital reuse. Nor is there any bar to creation of federal civil actions for habitual use of
copyrighted materials without obtaining licenses. The issue that most concerns me in this Article
is providing a sensible way for copyright owners to cope with large scale digital reuse of
copyrighted materials.
140. Both collect royalty streams and distribute them to copyright owners. For more
information about their specific plans, see ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2014), and SOUND EXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
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uses an image to degrade a person, market a product without permission,
or otherwise misuse the copyrighted work. Later re-users are sometimes
exempt from suit because they act without knowledge of the prior
violation of legal norms. In contrast to copyright, retractions and
confessions often have meaning in this space. In addition, issues like
these are usually not long term. Typically they happen, they produce
harm, a case is filed, damages (perhaps inexact) are levied, and the
dispute is over. These sorts of events, though often headline grabbing,
are also significantly less common than the now routine use, reuse, and
remixing of copyrighted materials online. Malefactors, therefore, are a
bit easier to trace; policing and enforcement costs are somewhat lower.
Accordingly, the available remedies provide more viable protection than
does copyright law. Put another way, nothing about the alterations in
copyright law I am suggesting mandates dramatic changes or large shifts
in the doctrinal content of most other areas of civil entertainment law.
Regardless of what happens in the copyright realm, defamation,
trademark, publicity rights, unfair competition, and consumer protection
law can proceed largely unaffected or respond and change to the digital
world in accordance with their own drumbeats. Indeed, the existence of
these bodies of law makes it easier to argue that traditional controls held
by copyright owners over the making of derivative works can be eased.
As long as the most abusive forms of derivative work making are still
subject to some forms of legal restraint, our concerns about the control
authority of copyright owners over viral reuse can be muted.
There is one area, however, where extant American intellectual
property norms are inadequate in the new, digital world. Domestic moral
right law has been very weak since it was first embedded in the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990.4 ' The legislation protected only a
limited set of traditional artistic works, used language unrelated to the
digital age, relied upon archaic norms to establish the boundary lines
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of work, and, contrary to long-
standing rules in most of the rest of the world, allowed waiver of moral
right by an author. '42 Recognizing the loss of power held by copyright
owners to control the widespread distribution, display, and performance
of digital versions of their works exacerbates the likelihood that
141. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Indeed, a good argument may be made that the United
States has never really adhered to the moral right requirements of the Berne Convention and that
its claim to have done so is erroneous. A recent review of the content and shortcomings of
American moral right law is Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2. 0, 1 TEx. A&M L. REv. 873 (2014).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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inappropriate uses of copyrighted materials raising moral rights issues
will surface.
In its present form, VARA applies to "works of visual art"--
paintings, drawings, prints, photographs, or sculptures existing as single
copies or as part of a signed edition of 200 or fewer copies. '43 The
definition excludes diagrams, charts, movies, books, other printed
materials, and electronic publications.' The statute provides authors
with the right to claim authorship of a work of visual art and to prevent
the use of their name on a work not theirs.'45 It also bars "intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of a work of visual art that
is "prejudicial to [the artist's] honor or reputation" and bans "any
destruction of a work of recognized stature."'4 6 The traditional civil law
motivation for protections like these is based on the ideas that artistic
creation is inherently worthy, that misattribution of a work distorts the
value of that creativity, and that destruction or mutilation of a work
assaults the cultural significance of creative acts. The thing preserved is
cultural and artistic integrity-a value set deemed so important that it is
not subject to sale or waiver by the artist or the artist's successors. The
VARA provision allowing waiver by the express written agreement of an
author seriously undermines these traditional moral right values.'47 So
does the provision limiting the term of moral right protection to the life
of the author.' 8
Even the very limited form of moral right granted by U.S. law,
however, does not operate in the digital realm. The work protected by
VARA is the physical embodiment of a traditional artistic endeavor. Its
digitization and transformation online does not in any way alter the
attribution of authorship of or the actual physical qualities of a nondigital
work of visual art as defined in the act. Though authors might be able to
claim a remedy under other laws if their work is digitized over the name
of another person, the language of VARA does not provide such relief.'
143. Id § 101.
144. Id
145. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B).
146. Id. § 106A(2)(3)(A)-(B).
147. See id. § 106A(c).
148. See id § 1006A(d)(1)(4).
149. The famous case of Gilliam v American Broadcasting Cos., 538 E2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976), is the best example. The significant cutting of Monty Python episodes when shown on
American television led to claims under both copyright and trademark law. The latter theory,
accepted by the court, postulated that the heavily edited shows violated the attribution rights of
Monty Python. In essence, the shows were not really made by the comedy group. Though the
vitality of this trademark law precedent is questionable after Dastar Corp. v Twentieth Century
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Nor does digitization distort, mutilate, or modify the physical qualities of
the original work. For example, copying and then mutilating the online
digital image of Holding On and posting the changed image on another
website in no way disturbs the original and unique physical "work of
visual art" now hanging in our living room. And if the new copyright
world envisioned here operates, my wife's only form of relief might be
for money from a royalty-pooling system.
Is there anything wrong with that? Are there any circumstances
where something akin to traditional moral right should operate?
Certainly the existing VARA provisions or section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act should be altered to clearly provide relief against those who digitally
claim authorship of a work not theirs.'5 ° But the difficult nub of this
discussion turns on the concept of "prejudice to his or her honor or
reputation.""' It is in this area where existing protections for digital use
of tangible works are nonexistent and where the Web may operate with
particular cruelty. In traditional moral right cases, it is an original,
tangible object that is misattributed, altered, or destroyed. To present that
work to the world in mutilated form both alters the underlying work and
risks the artist's reputation. But in the digital realm, neither a digital nor
a nondigital original is altered by online changes. The author's work
remains entirely intact. The risk to reputation calculus therefore takes on
a different guise. While many online reuses of both nondigital and
digital works are either literal copies or creative remixes-reimaging,
editorial, or critical rehashes; sampling; audio or video mash-ups; or
collective reimaginings-a few are hurtful, nasty, and intentionally
harmful. The former raise no reputational moral right issues in the
digital world. The latter should be subject to narrowly drawn controls.
The language used in VARA to define "honor or reputation" is
archaic and does not fully capture the contemporary anxieties and
dangers of the digital world for artists and other creators. ' Nor does the
restriction of moral right to traditional, tangible fine art make much sense
in the digital age. I can imagine successful publicity rights claims after
works and their authors' names are used to advertise a product, an event,
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), there is no possible way the same case could be brought
under VARA.
150. The result in Dastarseems wrong to me, even under existing law. The Court held that
Dastar's sale as its own work of somewhat reworked versions of a previously issued and public
domain set of films about World War II was not barred by the Lanham Act. 539 U.S. at 26-27,
38. While that result is questionable, the underlying value of giving correct credit to prior authors
was ignored. Such results should not be allowed under any intellectual property regime.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(2)(3)(A).
152. Id.
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or a politician without permission. I can imagine trademark and
consumer protection laws resolving cases where authorship of digital
works is falsely claimed. But I cannot find a remedy or modest
expansion of present doctrine in extant law for a digital distortion or
mutilation of a nondigital or digital copyrighted work that significantly
damages the artistic integrity of the author. Under existing copyright law,
a copyright owner could prevent the distribution of such a derivative
work in the absence of fair use. But if a work is digitized, gone off on its
Web journey and, in accordance with the proposals in this Article, out of
the control of the copyright owner, the author or copyright owner might
be without any practical remedy for the digital insult. That result should
be avoided. To do so, moral right laws should be significantly expanded
to give authors the power to bar digital use of any copyrighted work in a
way that "substantially damages the creative integrity" of the author.'53
The right should last well beyond the life of the author and should not be
subject to waiver.'54
The expansion of moral right laws to include restraints on
inappropriate derivative works is, of course, subject to the same critiques
I make about copyright law in general-the practical inability of
copyright authors to control the widespread use of their work online and
track digitization pathways. If problems like these compel copyright
owners to cede control over the making of digital derivative works in
return for access to a royalty-pooling system, why should moral right
violations be structured differently? For starters, digital moral right
violations also involve the creations of derivative works. Their presence
online would be taken into account in use surveys used to determine the
size of payments of the royalty pool. In short, some minor economic
relief for moral right problems is inherent in the system described here.
The recommended changes in moral right laws are in addition to those
built into the royalty-pooling structure. Successfully finding and
sanctioning those responsible for moral right violations would provide
153. I have struggled for a long time over this phrasing. The wording still may not be
right. I am not particularly disturbed that I do not know exactly what it means. Allowing the
courts to fill the blank spaces over time is fine with me. But I do worry that this phrasing runs
afoul of First Amendment jurisprudence, establishes too broad a test, or solves the problem of
restraining only those actions that unfairly disturb the aesthetic preferences of an author.
Suggestions of different terminology are more than welcome.
154. As previously noted in the text, traditional European moral right law lasts indefinitely.
Relatives or the state are given the responsibility for enforcing the rule. That sort of regime
should be established here for both the existing moral rights provisions and any extensions
recommended in this Article. For a comprehensive table of international moral right provisions,
see ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 720-97 (2006).
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supplementary relief to artists harmed by the degrading or insulting use
of their works online. While there may be times when it is difficult or
impossible to find the party responsible for the initial misuse of material,
there is value in allowing actual or statutory damages and injunctions to
be levied against those who are discovered. It is also worth noting that
the scale of moral right violations pales in comparison to the level of
online remixing. While policing costs obviously exist, it is often much
easier to track misuse than widespread remixing.
D Fair Use
1. Fair Use by Remixers
One final issue begs discussion: fair use. Under the present
regime, two major sets of impediments to fair use cry out for a remedy.
First, the current digital system presents wildly divergent pictures to
creative souls. For those with scruples against bold appropriation who
honestly wish to claim fair use rights, it is difficult to predict the outcome
of any legal dispute that may arise. Rather than take a chance and claim
fair use, these users may actually purchase rights or forego creativity in
order to avoid paying royalties or legal fees.'55 It may also be difficult for
such users to understand why they should try to follow legal norms when
so many others now flaunt them without causing a flap.'56 In their minds,
it must seem that something is seriously off-kilter. Second, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and other statutory constraints on the
distribution of online copyrighted works make it very difficult for some
consumers of copyrighted materials to actually use their fair use rights.'57
Efforts to breach online security systems in order to make fair use of
material are not protected.'58 Though one may pay for access to a work
and subsequently use it fairly, this significantly alters the level of access
155. Continuing the appropriation theme of this Article, music sampling is a good example
of the problems. It is difficult to understand how musical parodies like that allowed in Campbell
v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), can stand side by side with the hostility to music
sampling displayed in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830
(M.D. Tenn. 2002). The insecurity created by such divergent results has led many in the industry
to routinely pay for using samples of music, even in cases where fair use probably exists.
156. One of the best-known mashup artists, Greg Gillis (better known as Girl Talk), does
not obtain licenses--so far without legal repercussions. See Joe Mullin, Why the Music Industry
Isn't Suing Mashup Star 'Girl Talk, 'GIGAOM (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.gigaom.com/2010/
11/16/419-why-the-music-industry-isnt-suing-mashup-star-girl-talk/. Mullin takes the position
that the industry does not sue because Gillis would become even more of a hero in the remix
world. Id. Such martyrs do not help the industry's cause.
157. Seel7U.S.C.§512.
158. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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traditionally available to many fair users. 59 The ability to go to a library
or other repository of copyrighted material, borrow or look at a work,
take notes on or copy some portion of a piece, and then use material
fairly in a new creative endeavor is gone in many digital settings. Free
access also may be absent in secure Internet environments. In a few
situations, the ability to copy or remix digital material, even on one's own
computer, may be limited in the absence of hacking. Finally, digital
systems containing large amounts of material may require users to join
and pay subscription fees even to obtain access to a single item.'6°
Creating secure pay systems is somewhat difficult and potentially leaky
in ways that may cause the copyright owner to lose control over display
and distribution rights under this Article's theory. However, fair use
rights may be seriously limited when such systems work.
The bargain inherent in the traditional copyright system that both
established incentives for the creation of new work and allowed for
creative and transformative use of extant materials may be as broken as
the literal copying and derivative work rules already discussed. This
result can be altered, but only by making transformative use of digital
materials as frictionless as possible. In essence, that is what the system
recommended here does, at least in part. For all digitized works that are
part of the royalty-pooling system, fair users need not worry about
whether their actions are legitimate or whether they must pay royalties to
gain access to a work. If they want to do something, they simply do it.
Any remix, absent a moral right violation, is legitimate.'6'
The fair use problem, therefore, is circumscribed in a royalty-
pooling world. The difficulties of discerning whether a use is fair arises
only with respect to copyrighted items not embedded in the royalty-
pooling system. At this juncture, it is not possible to predict with
precision which works will fall into the pool structure and which will not.
But it is reasonable to suppose that many copyright owners-especially
those in markets where digital duplication and remixing is rife-will
elect to participate in the pool and that such elections will become more
common as time goes on. Weighing the present policing problems and
159. For a summary of the complex provisions of the DMCA and its impact on fair use,
see The Digital Millennium Copynght Act of 1998 US. Copyight Office Summary, supM note
86, at 4-5.
160. Of course, gaining access to much material that is used fairly has not changed much.
Buying a book or sound recording online mimics pre-digital-age purchases in brick and mortar
stores. The issue here is not that fair use has been completely stifled, but that digitization has
constrained access or increased the cost of access in some settings.
161. Fair users, of course, pay for this freedom like everyone else when they purchase
digital equipment and pay the taxes. But once that is done, virtually all use is fair.
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costs against the ability to claim royalties from a pool is likely to create
significant incentives for many to cede control over digital reuse. But
even if the movement of owners to the royalty pool is small, the status of
fair users is improved. The existence of some frictionless fair use
opportunities is better than none at all.
2. Institutions and Fair Use
As described thus far, fair users, as part of the general public using
digital equipment taxed for creation of royalty pools, are in the same
position as everyone else manipulating or using materials from the
Internet. While fair users are freed from the need to ask for permission
to use works in which the owners have ceded their authority to control
remixing, that is also true of everyone else.'62 As noted, this has the effect
of reducing some barriers to fair use-especially those now embedded in
deciding what infringement risks exist, making a decision about whether
to seek permission for activity, and acting spontaneously on project ideas.
Should any further steps be taken? Two issues need to be resolved: the
fair use of materials behind secure paywalls or other digital barriers and
the role of institutions that frequently use material fairly.
While it may not be too much to ask a potential fair user to
purchase a copy of a work still controlled by the traditional copyright
system, there may be settings where that cost is too high, especially if
access is behind a secure paywall, browsing rights are limited, and entry
costs are high. When such a system exists, fair use is unfairly restrained
if access to one item is expensive or payment for all or most of the
material on a site is required. Institutions operating in this way should be
required to make reasonable single use fees available, much like those
now charged for access to single songs or books on many websites. In
addition, browsing systems like those available on many sites selling
books and music should be required wherever practical.
Another issue is institutional fair use, as opposed to the fair use of
materials held in large-scale organization websites. Use of equipment
taxation systems to raise money for those creating digital copyrighted
materials imposes a dramatically different cost structure on the use of
intellectual property. The present copyright law lowers the cost of using
162. It is possible that this sort of system creates an incentive on the part of consumers of
copyrighted material to "overuse" works. I do not think I care about such an incentive, even if it
works. It is hard to understand what "overuse" would mean here. And even if we could figure
that out, I do not think it makes any cultural sense to limit access to copyrighted works on the
theory that too much creativity would result from a frictionless internet access system. It is hard
to understand why creative reuses possibly could be deemed too extensive.
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protected material by not requiring fair users to obtain a license.'63 The
new system would not provide that benefit; everyone would have access
to material in the pooling system. Organizations that are widely
recognized as "hotbeds" of fair use would no longer gain the benefit of
lower licensing costs presently extended to them for their legitimate use
of materials. Educational institutions provide the most obvious example.
Much of the duplication and online distribution they do now is
considered fair use. In a world where such duplication and online
distribution is frictionless and free of copyright liability for works in the
pooling system, the reduction in licensing costs such institutions now
receive would disappear once taxed digital equipment is paid for. Their
effective tax rates would be similar to other large organizations that are
not fair use "hotbeds." The issue, therefore, is whether we should
provide institutions highly likely to be traditional fair users with
additional benefits by reducing the taxes they pay when they purchase
digital equipment. Much like a typical sales tax system allows payment
exemptions for nonprofit organizations and wholesalers, the fair use tax
system could operate in a way that imposes different rates on different
equipment buyers. Doing this would switch a significant part of the fair
use debate from individual use to institutional operations. While tax
discounts could also be bestowed on certain individuals, the
administrative costs, the potential for fraud, and the difficult task of
distinguishing those deserving a discount from those who do not may bar
such a practice.'" If we wish to encourage creativity, it makes a great
deal of sense to think about classes of organizations that are particularly
likely to enhance the intellectual, artistic, and creative parts of our world.
Relieving educational, artistic, musical, and other similar organizations
from payment of a portion of their digital equipment tax burden would be
an easy way to recognize the significance of their fair use of copyrighted
works.
163. That benefit is not "perfectly" distributed. There are costs to exercising fair use rights.
Some judgments that use is fair will turn out to be wrong. Litigation costs and damage penalties
might result. And some license fees may be "erroneously" paid to avoid the possibility of later
litigation.
164. In the sales tax world, the two most widely applied standards distinguish between
profit and nonprofit groups, and between retailers and wholesalers. These are both reasonably
easy to administer. In the copyright world, figuring out who deserves an exemption is difficult.
Should painters be favored over journalists, traditional sculptors over avant-garde installation
artists, or composers over cello players? Though I suspect no one wants to make such
determinations, it is possible that thoughtful regulators could develop appropriate definitions and
guidelines.
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V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion is short and sweet. Whatever one's view of the
wisdom of reconfiguring the copyright system as recommended here
may be, I hope it is clear that we cannot continue to use the current legal
structure much longer. The copyright system is deeply dysfunctional.
The stress in areas of copyright where digital work is now prominent is
rising too high and too fast for us to sit indefinitely on the sidelines in the
hope that the situation will get better.

